concluding that employer's deactivation of a safety lever on a snow blower did not meet the "intentional wrong" exception of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, where the snow blower still had warning labels that adequately informed the injured employee not to put his hand in the chute while its propellers were operating
How later courts described this case
- concluding that employer's deactivation of a safety lever on a snow blower did not meet the "intentional wrong" exception of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, where the snow blower still had warning labels that adequately informed the injured employee not to put his hand in the chute while its propellers were operating
- affirming summary judgment dismissing negligent-training claim as to employee’s use of snowblower, concluding “[n]o special training was required to be given . . . because it is a consumer product” with adequate warnings and instructions
- conduct prong was not satisfied where employer was "grossly negligent" and deactivated safety stop lever on snow blower and placed electrical tape over it to prevent its activation because, although employee was severely injured when he inserted his hand into blower's chute, he "knew or should have known that the propellers were operating when he inserted his hand into the chute"
- defendant entitled to summary judgment and jury verdict vacated where employer disabled safety lever on a snow blower because "the Legislature contemplated that those accidents would be part and parcel of workplace hazards covered by" the Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAZZALI, J.,
dissenting.
Because I believe that evidence that an employer disabled or knowingly tolerated the disabling of a safety device creates a *379 rebuttable presumption that the employer knew harm to an employee was substantially certain to result, Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products, 176 N.J. 385, 393-94 , 823 A.2d 782, 786-87 (2003) (Zazzali, J., concurring), I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
As the panel below noted, “that defendant was responsible for disabling the safety device on the snow blower” was “an inference that could be drawn.” Defendant admitted in its answer that the “snow blower was owned and/or under the control of the defendanVemployer.” In addition, plaintiffs deposition testimony indicated that the snow blower’s safety lever was disabled at the time of plaintiffs injury. Applying the rebuttable presumption I propose and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a material issue of fact exists in respect of whether a known substantial certainty of harm was present. Accordingly, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment was appropriate. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 , 666 A.2d 146 (1995).
The majority states in dicta that defenses such as “the presence of the warning labels, the consumer-user expectation and obviousness of danger incorporated into our Products Liability Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a(2), and the presumption that users of consumer products will heed the warnings with respect to dangers inherent in the consumer product should be considered under the context prong articulated in Millison.” Ante at 375, 823 A.2d at 776 . Notwithstanding my opposition to continued application of the context prong, see Crippen v. Central Jersey Concrete, 176 N.J. 397, 413-14 , 823 A.2d 789, 799-800 (2003) (Zazzali, J., concurring), I agree with Justice Albin’s conclusion that the defenses available to a product liability defendant under N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3 should not afford an employer summary judgment under N.J.S.A 34:15-8 without a further inquiry into the culpability of that employer’s conduct. I do believe, however, that to the extent that an employer knows harm to an employee is unlikely to *380 result because of the presence of warning labels or the obviousness of danger, those facts may be probative of whether the degree of risk created by the employer is tantamount to a “known substantial certainty of harm.” Accordingly, when an employer proffers such rebuttal evidence it generally should be admissible to aid the jury in determining whether the employer possessed the requisite state of mind to justify liability in intentional tort.
I would affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment.