explaining in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act that a widow who obtained a finding of her late husband’s employer’s gross negligence and offered evidence of actual damages could recover exemplary damages, despite the fact that the Act barred recovery of actual damages and no finding of actual damages was requested
How later courts described this case
- explaining in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act that a widow who obtained a finding of her late husband’s employer’s gross negligence and offered evidence of actual damages could recover exemplary damages, despite the fact that the Act barred recovery of actual damages and no finding of actual damages was requested
- concluding, before enactment of section 41.008 of the civil practice and remedies code, that jury findings on actual damages not prerequisite to exemplary damages in workers’ compensation case; noting not in conflict with Nabours, which requires finding of actual damages, because workers’ compensation cases distinct
- holding that in an action for exemplary damages for the death of an employee covered by workers’ compensation, the plaintiff is not required to plead and submit special issues on actual damages, since actual damages cannot be recovered under the Workers’ Compensation Act
- holding that a plaintiff need not secure a finding on the amount of actual damages to recover exemplary damages under the former workers’ compensation statute, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967) 2
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. It has long been the rule of law in Texas that a plaintiff must secure jury findings on the existence and amount of actual damages in order to recover exemplary damages. Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association, 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.1985): Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128 , 70 S.W.2d 397 (1934).
The majority, however, holds that this rule does not apply in a gross negligence death case brought under TEX.REV.CIV. STAT. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967) (part of the Worker’s Compensation Act). The majority reaches this result despite this court’s holding to the contrary in Fort Worth Elevators v. Russell, decided in 1934 and never before today questioned or overruled. The majority determines here, without legal analysis, that such a rule is “archaic and unnecessary.” Citing no legal authority, the majority summarily concludes that “an exact amount of actual damages is not necessary to determine whether the exemplary damages are reasonable” and disapproves Fort Worth Elevators “in the interest of judicial economy.” Let there be no mistake about it: the Fort Worth Elevators court squarely held that “there can be no recovery of exemplary damages in the absence of a recovery of actual damages” and that “we do not believe that the compensation act changes the rule.” Id. at 150, 70 S.W.2d at 409 . “Moreover,” said the Fort Worth Elevar tors court, “the rule in this state is that the amount of exemplary damages allowed must be reasonably proportioned to the actual damages found” and, further, “the jury should have been asked to find whether or not the defendants in error (plaintiffs below) sustained actual damages by reason of the death of Russell, and, if so, the amount thereof.” Id.
This court has never before questioned that the proportionality requirement is a rule with a reason, ensuring that exemplary damages are not awarded because of passion or prejudice. Nabours, 700 S.W.2d at 904 . Why then does the majority suddenly and without warning disapprove this prior case law? What ever happened to the rule of stare decisis? How can the Fort Worth Elevators precedent be so casually disregarded “in the interest of judicial economy?” Because of Fort Worth Elevators, the majority cannot explain legally why actual damages are “not involved” in this case. Thus, the majority contents itself to simply, state that actual damages are “not involved,” without giving any explanation other than to say that any other viewpoint is “nonsensical.” Is this the refuge to which we must retreat when trying to explain the unexplainable?
One of the primary reasons for having law and respect for precedent in the first place is to foster a degree of stability and predictability in our society. The majority has totally lost sight of this fact as it unhesitatingly discards an unbroken line of respected, carefully-reasoned precedent. Thus, I dissent.
GONZALEZ, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.