The opinion
KELLY, Judge,
dissenting:
Initially, I note my agreement with the majority that the instant appeal is from a final order. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a trial court does not have the authority pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2959 to require appellants to post a bond as a prerequisite to granting their petition to open a judgment by confession.
I would find that the trial court was within its discretion to require appellants to post a bond as security for the payment of appellee’s judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 2959 does not prohibit a court from imposing a bond as a requirement for proceedings with a Petition to Open Judgment. 1 In fact, existing case law provides authority for imposing a bond requirement under the circumstances found in this case. See Britton v. Continental Mining & Smelting Corp., 366 Pa. 82 , 76 A.2d 625 (1950).
In Britton , the plaintiff secured and attempted to enforce a default judgment against the defendant, an out-of-state entity. The defendant filed a petition to open judgment and the plaintiff appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s rule to open judgment but only after imposing a surety requirement on the defendant. In imposing this requirement, the court stated:
[A]s the defendant, a foreign corporation, has apparently no assets within this state, the plaintiff is entitled to some protection in his right to collect his verdict if he obtains one. The opening of the judgment being entirely a matter of grace, should be further conditioned on the defendants entering security in such amount and with such surety as *23 the court below shall direct. No doubt the court below would have so directed had it been so requested.
Id. at 86 , 76 A.2d at 627 .
The trial court in the instant case imposed a bond requirement upon appellants (who were not residents of, nor had any assets in, Pennsylvania) in order to provide some security to appellee. Thus, in accordance with Britton, supra, the trial court acted within its discretion when it imposed the bond requirement and properly directed that appellants’ petition to open confessed judgment be struck if they failed to post the required bond. See also Norristown Rug Mfg. Co. v. Mirabile, 71 Montg. 222 (1953) (court required bond to open confessed judgment); Maggs v. New Deal Lifetime Homes, 12 Lycoming 143 (1971) (defendant’s petition to open judgment was refused for failure to post bond prior to opening judgment). Hence, I dissent.
. Rule 2959, Explanatory Notes-1979, of the Pennsylvania Rules of Court (1991) refers to the Act of July 9, 1897, P.L. 237, 12 P.S. 911 which requires the posting of a bond in certain circumstances.