holding that when a statute read literally and in context is capable of being understood in two ways, it is classically ambiguous when the parties take polarized positions
How later courts described this case
- holding that when a statute read literally and in context is capable of being understood in two ways, it is classically ambiguous when the parties take polarized positions
- relator assigned judge entitled to mandamus relief because, among other things, respondent state had no “clear legal right” to remove relator under Section 74.053(d)
- finding ambiguous a statute silent on whether "a case" refers to a criminal case or a civil case
- "In making th[e] determination [of what constitutes a 'criminal law matter'], we are not bound by the fact that there may be civil law facets to the issue at hand, anymore than the Texas Supreme Court, in determining whether a matter is civil in nature, is bound by the fact that the matter may be quasi-criminal.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Believing the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issue here presented, I respectfully dissent. The majority notes that “there is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of the 1991 amendments suggesting anyone intended for subsection (d) to apply to civil and criminal cases.” (Op. at 587, emphasis in original.) Likewise, there is nothing in that history suggesting the Legislature intended to exclude criminal cases from the application of subsection (d).
Whatever arguments would support this procedure in civil cases would, I believe, be equally applicable to criminal cases. Further, the Legislature has made obvious distinctions between former and retired judges. The jeopardy the majority foresees in the Court of Appeals’ analysis applies as well to civil matters.
*589 I would adopt the Court of Appeals' analysis in all respects.