Gaver v. Harrant

ADKINS, judge,

dissenting.

I agree with the majority that “adoption of a new cause of action involves serious public policy concerns,” and that this Court should not “ ‘alter a common law rule in the face of indications that to do so would be contrary to the public policy of the State.’ ” Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 28-29 , 557 A.2d 210, 216 (1989) (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460 , 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983)); see also, e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 141 , 497 A.2d 1143, 1151 (1985). I respectfully dissent because I believe that the legislature’s policy towards children and the importance of the family in Maryland, both embodied in various statutes enacted by that body, indicate that adoption of a cause of action for a minor child’s loss of parental society and companionship when the parent is injured by the tortious act of a third party is wholly consistent with the public policy of this State.

*34 When this Court has refused to change or modify the common law, its decision has been based upon a clear indication from the legislature that to do so would be contrary to the public policy of this State. For example, in Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51 , 405 A.2d 255 (1979), we refused to judicially abrogate the doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability. 286 Md. at 54 , 405 A.2d at 257 . Because the General Assembly had refused to abrogate the doctrine “in the face of repeated reminders of its role in the matter in the opinions of this Court,” we determined that the public policy of Maryland did not favor our taking action on the matter. Id. at 55-58 , 405 A.2d at 257-259 . In his concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge pointed out that the issue of State immunity had “consistently been a legislative matter in Maryland,” and that the legislature, three years previously, had decided that the State’s immunity should be abrogated solely in contract actions. Id. at 70 , 405 A.2d at 265 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Thus, the public policy with regard to immunity in tort actions was particularly clear.

In Howard v. Bishop Byrne Home, 249 Md. 233 , 238 A.2d 863 (1968), our decision not to abrogate the doctrine of charitable immunity from tort liability was based upon the fact that the “General Assembly [had] completely investigated the immunity question, and the present statutes are tangible evidence that the Legislature arrived at a solution which it deemed satisfactory.” 249 Md. at 241-242 , 238 A.2d at 868 . Legislative policy was also clear in our decision not to create dram shop liability. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174 , 438 A.2d 494 (1981). There, we determined that the failure of the legislature to create dram shop liability in the face both of our refusal to do so thirty years previously and of the growing number of states to create such an action since our decision indicated that the public policy of Maryland was against the trend. 292 Md. at 183-184 , 438 A.2d at 499 . Similarly, in Harrison, supra, we decided not to replace the contributory negligence doctrine with a comparative fault system because the position of the legislature *35 was clearly against the change. Between 1966 and 1982, the legislature had declined to enact twenty-one bills which would have done precisely what was asked of us in Harrison, 295 Md. at 462 , 456 A.2d at 904 . This, we noted, was an indication of the legislature’s intention to retain the contributory negligence doctrine. Id.

On the other hand, we have not hesitated to change the common law when “it has become unsound in the circumstances of modem life.” Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 590 , 414 A.2d 929, 981 (1980). Often, that conclusion has emanated in whole or in part from legislative action setting public policy. We have, for example, determined that various common law doctrines were unsound in light of the legislature’s passage and subsequent voter ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242 , 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (interspousal immunity rule); Condore v. Prince George's Co., 289 Md. 516 , 425 A.2d 1011 (1981) (necessaries doctrine); Kline, supra (cause of action for criminal conversion).

In Kelley, supra, we imposed strict liability upon the manufacturers and marketers of “Saturday Night Specials.” We determined that the right to possess and carry certain handguns was sanctioned by the legislature. 804 Md. at 144, 497 A.2d at 1152-1158 . But one class of handguns, the “Saturday Night Special,” was not protected under the statutory provisions covering other handguns. Id. at 144 , 497 A.2d at 1158 . Thus, public policy did not oppose, but, in fact, favored the imposition of strict liability for injuries caused by their use. Id. at 157 , 497 A.2d at 1159 . 1 These decisions make it clear that we will change or modify the common law when public policy calls for or is consistent with action. I believe action is called for in this *36 case; public policy clearly supports our adoption of a cause of action for a minor’s loss of parental society and companionship resulting from the tortious act of a third party that causes injury to the parent.

At common law, a husband/father had a proprietary interest in the services of his wife and minor children. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 124, at 916 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); see also Note, Child’s Right to Sue for Negligent Disruption of Parental Consortium, 22 Washburn L.J. 78 , 81-82 (1982) (“A man’s wife and children were perceived as chattel”). When a wife or minor child was injured by the tort of a third party, the husband/father was entitled to recover from the tortfeasor for lost services; this action stemmed from the common law action a master had for the lost services of an injured servant. W. Prosser, § 125, at 931-935. Over the years, the nature of recovery for “loss of consortium” changed from recovery limited to the loss of services to a broader remedy of damages for loss of society, affection, companionship, comfort, and in the case of injury to the wife, sexual relations. Id. § 125, at 931; see also 2 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 8.8, at 536 (2d ed. 1986); Comment, Who Should Recover for Loss of Consortium?, 35 Me.L.Rev. 295, 300 (1983). Thus, although the roots of a consortium claim lie “in the father’s [or husband’s] proprietary right to the child’s [or wife’s] services, the origin of the action is of minimal significance today.” Note, The Child’s Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent’s Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L.Rev. 722, 731 (1976) [footnote omitted]. At common law, neither the wife nor children were entitled to pursue a similar cause of action, with respect to injury to the husband/father. W. Prosser, § 125, at 931, 935.

Passage of Married Womens’ Acts in Maryland 2 and other states around the close of the nineteenth century *37 gave women additional rights, including the right to sue for torts committed against them, engage in business, and contract, although these statutes were at first construed in a strained and grudging fashion. See generally Boblitz, supra, 296 Md. at 244-251 , 462 A.2d at 507-510 ; Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 339-346 , 390 A.2d 77, 79-83 (1978).

In Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95 , 231 A.2d 514 (1967), this Court noted that the “medieval concept” of the common law regarding the inability of a woman to sue for loss of consortium was not totally “in accord with modern legal thought.” 247 Md. at 107 , 231 A.2d at 521 . In that case the Court recognized that it is the marital relationship or entity that is adversely affected when one of the spouses is physically injured by a third party’s tortious act. Id. at 108 , 231 A.2d at 522 . Deems changed the common law to permit a joint action, in which both spouses can recover for the injury to the marital relationship. Id. at 115 , 231 A.2d at 525 . Almost a decade later, we noted it was “clear that the underlying purpose and rationale of the joint action is to compensate the individual persons who form that relationship for the personal injury which they both sustain.” Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 355 , 363 A.2d 955, 965 (1976) [emphasis added]. Thus, injury to the marital entity results in a compensable injury to two people for which this Court has required that they bring a joint action.

As In the case of women, recognition of rights of children has been slow in coming. This Court has long permitted a parent (a father only at early common law) to recover for loss of a minor child’s services, society, etc. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521 , 174 A.2d 889 (1961); Seglinski v. Baltimore Copper Co., 149 Md. 541 , 131 A. 774 (1926); Hussey v. Ryan, 64 Md. 426 , 2 A. 729 (1886); County Commissioners v. Hamilton, 60 Md. 340 (1883); see also Family Law Art., §§ 5-205, 5-206. Of course, no similar action presently exists for a minor child. See W. Prosser, supra, § 125, at 935 (“The interest of the child in proper parental care and affection ... ran into a stone wall *38 where the defendant was merely negligent in causing injury to the parent.”); Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich.L.Rev. 177, 185 (1916) (there was no legal right at common law to protect a child’s interest in the society and affection of a parent).

Nevertheless, in the second half of this century, courts have recognized that minor children are not mere chattels, but persons also entitled to many of the same constitutional protections and freedoms as adults. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 , 95 S.Ct. 729 , 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) (due process); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (criminal procedure—proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 , 89 S.Ct. 733 , 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (freedom of speech); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself). Furthermore, the General Assembly of Maryland has increasingly recognized the social importance of the family, the need to protect this institution, and a particular need to protect children.

Section 4-401 of the Family Law Article establishes the General Assembly’s policy with regard to families with children:

The General Assembly declares:

(1) that it is the policy of this State to promote family stability, to preserve family unity, and to help families achieve and maintain self-reliance by:

(1) responding to financial and family crisis through direct provision of family counseling and supportivé services; and

(ii) referral to appropriate community resources; and

(2) this State has the responsibility to provide services that prevent the kind of family dissolution and breakdown that requires protective services or out-of-home placement.

*39 Also, in an attempt to preserve the family unit, the legislature has declared that the rights of natural parents may be terminated only upon a finding by a court that to do so is, by clear and convincing evidence, in the best interests of the child. Family Law Art., § 5-313(a) (1988 Cum.Supp.).

Numerous sections of the Family Law Article look to the protection of minor children. Parents are, by statute, made jointly and severally responsible for their child’s “support, care, nurture, welfare, and education____” Id. § 5-208(b)(1); see also id. § 5--1002(b)(2) (providing children born out of wedlock with the same rights). Children are protected from child abuse and neglect. Id. § 5-701 et seq. (1988 Cum.Supp.). Penalties are provided for leaving young children unattended. Id., § 5-801 (1988 Cum.Supp.). In the case of children placed in child or foster care, the General Assembly has voiced its special concern:

(a) The General Assembly declares that:

(1) minor children are not capable of protecting themselves; and

(2) when a parent has relinquished the care of the parent’s minor child to others, there is a possibility of certain risks to the child that require compensating measures.

(b) It is the policy of this State:

(1) to protect minor children whose care has been relinquished to others by the children’s parent;

(2) to resolve doubts in favor of the child when there is a conflict between the interests of a minor child and the interests of an adult; and

(3) to encourage the development of day care services for minor children in a safe, healthy, and homelike environment.

Id. § 5-502.

The common law with regard to the manner in which custody of children is granted to parents upon their divorce has been changed. At common law, the father was entitled to custody of his minor children. DeGrange v. Kline, 254 *40 Md. 240, 242 , 254 A.2d 353, 354 (1969). The standard upon which custody of children is now granted to parents is what a court finds to be “in the best interests of the particular child and most conducive to h:is welfare.” Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174 , 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977); see also Family Law Art. § 9-202(a) (Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act provides guidelines for resolving custody disputes, all geared toward the best interests of children); Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303 , 508 A.2d 964, 970 (1986).

This Court has recognized the importance of a stable family. In Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 , 505 A.2d 826 (1986), we were asked to abrogate the parent-child immunity doctrine. We discussed the purpose of the doctrine:

“The doctrine is founded upon public policy, and is designed to preserve the peace and harmony of the home, under normal conditions, as well as to recognize the authority of the parent, under normal conditions, responsible for the maintenance of the home.”

305 Md. at 550 , 505 A.2d at 830 (quoting Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 134 , 190 A. 753, 756 (1937)). We declined to abrogate the doctrine and the important social policy embodied within it. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839 . The importance and worth of children were also evident in Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257 , 473 A.2d 429 (1984), a wrongful birth case, where we required that the parents’ recovery be offset by the nonpecuniary benefits, such as society and companionship, muring to them because of the birth of the child. 299 Md. at 272-274 , 473 A.2d at 436-437 . Therefore, in Maryland today, the importance of family relationships and the benefits of a healthy and stable family atmosphere inuring to both parents and children are recognized and protected by law.

Thus, the development of the common law, the needs of contemporary society, and public policy as enunciated by the General Assembly, all favor the cause of action that the Gavers seek to establish. The public policy factor is made especially clear in § 3-904(d) of the Courts and Judicial *41 Proceedings Article, which we shall visit shortly. Before doing that, however, it is useful to reflect on the fact that the harm done a minor child through loss of parental consortium is genuine and substantial.

Although the extent of a child’s injury may vary depending upon the physical injury incurred by a parent because of the tortious act of a third party, there can be no doubt that there is a real injury suffered by a child in those circumstances.

“A child has an interest in the society and affection of his parent. Furthermore, the society, education, protection and love of a parent is necessary for the child’s welfare and development. ‘The child, for the full and harmonious development of his personality, needs love and understanding.’ When the child is deprived of his parents’ society, care, protection and affection he suffers a real injury____ Similarly, the child’s loss of his parents’ love, society and protection deprives him of the essentials for a healthy development and thus results in a real injury to the child.

“Protection of the child against this type of injury to the family relationship is equally important to the state. Since the character of the child has an impact on society ‘it is of the highest importance to the child and society that its rights to receive the benefits derived from its mother [or father] be protected.’ ”

Theama By Bichler v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis.2d 508, 515 , 344 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis.1984) (quoting comment, The Child’s Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages: A Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 San Diego L.Rev. 281, 237-238 (1975) [footnotes omitted; brackets in original]. Recently, many courts have recognized this loss and have permitted children to recover for loss of a parent’s consortium when the parent is tortiously injured by a third party. See, e.g., Leach v. Newport Yellow Cab, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 293 (S.D.Ohio 1985), aff'd, 815 F.2d 704 (6th Cir.1987); Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) *42 (en banc), modified, Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983) (en banc); Dearborn Fabricating & Eng’g Corp. v. Wickham, 532 N.E.2d 16 (Ind.Ct.App.1988); Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, Inc., 381 Mass. 507 , 413 N.E.2d 690 (1980) ; Berger v. Weber, 411 Mich. 1 , 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981) , aff'g, 82 Mich.App. 199 , 267 N.W.2d 124 (1978); Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.1987); Hay v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., 145 Vt. 533 , 496 A.2d 939 (1985); Ueland v. Reynolds Metal Co., 103 Wash.2d 131 , 691 P.2d 190 (1984) (en banc); Theama, supra; see also Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 , 108 S.Ct. 311 , 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987) (children’s interest in the continued companionship and society of a parent is a cognizable liberty interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, family relationship is protected from State interference); Kelly v. T.L. James Co., 603 F.Supp. 390 (W.D.La.1985) (loss of society and services suffered by a child with an injured parent is a compensable injury under general maritime law). But see In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 856 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.1988) (asserting that the Supreme Court of Texas, despite its decision in Salinas, supra, would not recognize the cause of action); Sanders v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 21 Ohio App.3d 249 , 487 N.E.2d 588 (1985) (Ohio intermediate appellate court declined to recognize the cause of action). 3 Virtually all *43 modem commentators advocate recognition of a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. 4

Maryland presently permits a minor child to recover nonpecuniary losses including “damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education ” in a wrongful death action when a parent is killed. Md.Ann.Code (1984 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud.Proc. Art., § 3-904(d) [emphasis added]. 5 “The state of the law in this area is anomalous in that a child may recover for loss of consortium if [a] parent dies as a result of another’s negligence, but not if the severely injured parent remains alive but in a vegetative state.” Ueland, supra, 103 Wash.2d at 134 , 691 P.2d at 192 ; see also Hibpshman, supra, 734 P.2d at 994 n. 10 (“when the parent is not so severely injured as to be in a vegetative state; the amount of loss of consortium damages will reflect the degree of the child’s loss”).

An additional anomaly occurs in permitting a spouse (or spouses), and not a minor child, to recover for loss of consortium. A minor child, as noted by the Supreme Court *44 of Iowa, is likely to incur a greater injury than a spouse when a parent is physically injured.

“Since the child in his formative years requires emotional nurture to develop properly, the loss of love, care and companionship is likely to have a more severe effect on him than on an adult; and society has a strong interest in seeing that the child’s emotional development proceeds along healthy lines. Moreover, an adult is in a better position than a child to adjust to the loss of a family member’s love, care and companionship through his own resources. He is capable of developing new relationships in the hope of replacing some of the emotional warmth of which he has been deprived. A child, however, is relatively powerless to initiate new relationships that might mitigate the effect of his deprivation. Legal redress may be the child’s only means of mitigating the effect of his loss.”

Weitl, supra, 311 N.W.2d at 269 (quoting Note, The Child's Right to Sue, 56 B.U.L.Rev. at 742).

Recognition of this cause of action for a minor child would also be consistent with this Court’s view of the importance of a stable and harmonious family. See Frye, supra. Injury to a parent by the tortious act of a third party clearly is an interference with that stability and harmony. See Leach, supra, 628 F.Supp. at 303 (“destruction of the family harmony and tranquility” results from negligence of third party).

The majority opposes the recognition of this cause of action because of the inadequacy of money damages and the speculative nature of recovery. 316 Md. at 30 , 557 A.2d at 217 . It enlists the aid of the Supreme Court of California which has said:

Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; monetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companionship and guidance of a mother____ To say that plaintiffs have been ‘compensated’ for their loss is superficial____

*45 Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal.3d 441, 447 , 563 P.2d 858, 862 , 138 Cal.Rptr. 302, 306 (1977) (en banc). This, however, is an inevitable shortcoming of our tort system. Money damages are “the only workable way that our legal system has found to ease the injured party’s tragic loss” in this circumstance and in many other areas of tort law. Theama, supra, 117 Wis.2d at 523 , 344 N.W.2d at 520 ; see also Hay, supra, 145 Vt. at 541 , 496 A.2d at 944 . The legislature in enacting § 8-904(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article has signified its approval of an award of monetary damages to recover for nonpecuniary losses. And although the nature of the recovery is speculative, it is no more speculative than the solatium recovery presently permitted in wrongful death, or in any award involving pain and suffering, personal injury, or emotional distress. See, e.g., Hay, 145 Vt. at 541 , 496 A.2d at 943-944 ; see also C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 27, at 102 (1985) (it is a perversion of justice to deny relief to an injured plaintiff solely because damages are speculative).

The majority also is concerned about the “expansion of consortium-type claims.... ” 316 Md. at 31 , 557 A.2d at 217 . It fears “the substantial expansion of tortfeasor liability and the accompanying societal costs, that will be imposed by this new cause of action.” Id. But precisely the same apprehensions arise when a child seeks consortium damages for the wrongful death of a parent; they did not deter the legislature in the wrongful death context. And in any case, these concerns can be addressed. As to the “societal costs” (ie., insurance costs) even if we speculate that premiums will increase solely because the new cause of action is recognized, that fact alone is not reason enough to deny recovery to a class of plaintiffs that deserves a remedy consistent with the public policy of this State. As the Supreme Court of Michigan has reasoned:

Recognizing the child’s cause of action may result in increased insurance costs, but compensating a child who has suffered emotional problems because of the depriva *46 tion of a parent’s love and affection may provide the child with the means of adjustment to the loss. The child receives the immediate benefit of the compensation, but society will also benefit if the child is able to function without emotional handicap. This may well offset any increase in insurance premiums.

Berger, supra, 411 Mich. at 15 , 303 N.W.2d at 426 .

As to the supposed problem of multiple litigation, I would hold that a child’s loss of parental consortium must be joined with the injured parent’s claim for damages (as in the case of loss of spousal consortium) whenever feasible. In order to bring a separate action, the child would have to show why joinder was not feasible. See Weitl, 311 N.W.2d at 270 ; Ueland, 103 Wash.2d at 140 , 691 P.2d at 194 . Moreover, I would limit the cause of action to loss of parental consortium by a minor child, thereby paralleling the statutory remedy in wrongful death cases. And I would limit the child’s recovery to loss of society and companionship. This would preclude any double recovery for the parent’s lost wages; the parent could recover for those as part of his or her claims against the tortfeasor, if appropriate. See Hibpshman, 734 P.2d at 996 ; Theama, 117 Wis.2d at 526 , 344 N.W.2d at 551-552 .

In summary, I am convinced that public policy calls for establishment of a cause of action for a child’s loss of parental consortium when the parent has been tortiously injured by a third party. I would reverse.

. Our decision in Kelley has been overruled by the General Assembly and the citizens of Maryland in the passage of Chapter 533 of the Acts of 1988 as ratified in a public referendum. See Md.Code, Art. 27, § 36-I(h) (1989 Advance Code Serv.). Public policy in this area, therefore, seems to have changed.

. See Ch. 457 of the Acts of 1898, now codified as Md.Ann.Code (1984 Repl.Vol.), Family Law Art. §§ 4-203—4-205.

. As the cases cited in the text to which this footnote is appended demonstrate, the majority is incorrect in asserting that only six states have adopted the cause of action at common law. The majority accurately states that more courts have rejected the cause of action than have adopted it—despite some decisions that have perceived an "emerging trend” in favor of the minority view. See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 , 992-993 n. 6 (Alaska 1987); see also Beikmann v. International Playtex, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 255, 258 (D.Colo.1987). The majority opinion is further supported by Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264 (Me.1987). The resolution of these differing views should not be accomplished by counting noses, however, but by examining the reasoning underlying each side of the issue.

. See, e.g., W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 125, at 935-936 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); Love, Tortious Interference With the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person’s Society and Companionship, 51 Ind.L.J. 590 (1976); Note, The Child's Right to Sue for Loss of a Parent’s Love, Care and Companionship Caused by Tortious Injury to the Parent, 56 B.U.L.Rev. 722 (1976); Comment, The Child's Claim for Loss of Consortium Damages: 21 Logical and Sympathetic Appeal, 13 San Diego L.Rev. 231 (1975); Comment, The Child’s Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 5 San.Fern.V.L.Rev. 449 (1977); Note, Compensating the Child’s Loss of Parental Love, Care, and Affection, 1983 U.Ill.L.Rev. 293; Note, Child’s Right to Sue for Negligent Disruption of Parental Consortium, 22 Washburn L.J. 78 (1982); see generally Annotation, Child’s Right of Action for Loss of Support, Training, Parental Attention, or the Like, Against a Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 11 A.L.R.4th 549 (1982).

. It is particularly noteworthy that the “sexual" aspect of consortium is only one element of the enumerated list of noneconomic damages (marital care) in a wrongful death action.