trial judge in prosecution of defendant for murder did not abuse her discretion in refusing to declare mistrial after occurrence of an outburst in that a courtroom spectator was heard crying
How later courts described this case
- trial judge in prosecution of defendant for murder did not abuse her discretion in refusing to declare mistrial after occurrence of an outburst in that a courtroom spectator was heard crying
- affirming denial of motion for mistrial where defendant made no showing of prejudice
- evidence of subsequent criminal conduct admissible to show that killing was not accidental
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth, over defense objection, to discredit appellant’s defense by way of evidence that, on the day after commission of the offenses charged, appellant was arrested while possessing an unloaded shotgun and shells which did not fit the gun. This error in admitting such highly prejudicial evidence over defense objection requires that the judgment of sentence be vacated and a new trial ordered.
It is hornbook law that “the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless *530 the evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that he committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.” McCormick on Evidence § 190 at 447 (Cleary ed. 1972). See, e. g., 1 Wigmore on Evidence §§ 192-194 (3d ed. 1940). As our cases have often stated,
“[t]he purpose of this rule is to prevent the conviction of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence that he has committed other unrelated crimes, and to preclude the inference that because he has committed other crimes he was more likely to commit that crime for which he is being tried. The presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.”
Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. 601, 604-605 , 391 A.2d 1048, 1049-50 (1978). Accord, e. g., Commonwealth v. Terry, 462 Pa. 595 , 342 A.2d 92 (1975); Commonwealth v. Clark, 453 Pa. 449 , 309 A.2d 589 (1973); Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177 , 292 A.2d 373 (1972).
The majority recognizes the general prohibition against introduction of other criminal acts. However, the majority points to the exception permitting the introduction of evidence which tends to show, “by similar acts or incidents, that the act on trial was not inadvertent, accidental, unintentional, or without guilty knowledge.” McCormick, supra, at p. 450 (footnote omitted). In the view of the majority, the Commonwealth permissibly introduced evidence that, on the day after the shooting, appellant possessed an unloaded shotgun and shells which did not fit the gun because the evidence tended to negate appellant’s claim that the shooting was wholly accidental.
Contrary to the majority’s summary assertion, the challenged evidence utterly fails to negate appellant’s claim of accident. Essential to the legitimate use of other criminal conduct as a means of negating a claim of accident is
*531 similarity. See Commonwealth v. Raymond, 412 Pa. 194 , 194 A.2d 150 (1963). As Wigmore explains,
“it is at least necessary that prior acts should be similar. Since it is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that carries probative weight, the essence of this probative effect is the likeness of the instance.”
II Wigmore on Evidence § 302 at 245 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). Here, the subsequent conduct, possession of the unloaded gun and shells which did not fit the gun, bore no similarity to the act of shooting for which appellant was being tried. Indeed, the record fails even to suggest that appellant had ever used the second shotgun. Thus this evidence carries no probative weight on the issue of whether the shooting was accidental. See Commonwealth v. Bond, 261 Pa.Super. 311, 318 , 396 A.2d 414, 417 (1978) (Spaeth, J.) (previous unsuccessful extortion threat against robbery victim not sufficiently similar to robbery to show intent to rob).
The Commonwealth maintains that any error in permitting the introduction of the unloaded shotgun and shells which did not fit the gun was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the allegedly “overwhelming” evidence of appellant’s guilt. However, if the Commonwealth’s evidence is so overwhelming, obviously no interest of justice was advanced by the Commonwealth’s insistence on the admission of prejudicial evidence over objection, wholly lacking in probative value, and the trial court’s admission of such evidence. Indeed, the fourteenth amendment forbids “fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 , 62 S.Ct. 280, 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). A truth-seeking process founded upon integrity and fairness and dedicated to the evenhanded administration of criminal justice manifestly cannot condone convictions stained by prosecutorial evidence which impermissibly impugns the accused. A verdict so obtained cannot stand.
Appellant should be granted a new trial.