“Mulgrew unanimously held that ‘when insanity is raised as a possible defense to criminal charges, a jury must be instructed concerning the possible psychiatric treatment and commitment of the defendant after the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.’ ” (Citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “Mulgrew unanimously held that ‘when insanity is raised as a possible defense to criminal charges, a jury must be instructed concerning the possible psychiatric treatment and commitment of the defendant after the return of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.’ ” (Citation omitted)
- fairness demands that relief be granted not only in case which successfully contests a rule of law, but also in cases on direct appeal which suffer same infirmity
- “ ‘Evenhanded decision-making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.’ ” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120 (1982)
Accord Commonwealth v. Brown, 494 Pa. 380, 385, 431 A.2d 905, 908 (1981) (“ ‘Evenhanded decision-making requires that similarly situated individuals on direct appeal be treated the same.’ ” (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 500 Pa. 120, 134, 454 A.2d 991, 999 (1982).
The opinion
NIX, Justice,
concurring.
In granting relief to the instant appellant, the majority enters into a lengthy discussion as to whether the holding in Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271 , 380 A.2d 349 (1977) is applicable to the instant case. In my judgment, this inquiry is unnecessary in reaching the proper result here. For the reasons that follow, I believe it is clear that appellant is entitled to relief regardless of the decision as to the applicability of Mulgrew .
During the closing argument, the prosecuting attorney stated:
If you accept the fact that Melvin Brown didn’t know what he was doing when he was up in that room, well then, put him out in the street.
N.T. 497 (Emphasis added).
The defense at trial was that Brown should be found not guilty by reason of insanity. The above referred to statement in the summation of the prosecutor clearly suggested that the verdict sought by the defense would in effect result in “putting Brown back on the street.”
In his points for charge which had been submitted to the court prior to the closing arguments, the defense had requested a charge that the jury be informed of the available *387 alternatives under the Mental Health Procedures Act 1 if a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was returned. After the remark by the prosecutor was made, defense counsel again urged the court to clarify the types of dispositions that would be available in the event of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. Upon the denial of these requests, the defense moved for a mistrial and that motion was also denied. In view of the misleading aspect of the prosecutor’s remark, the defense was entitled to the sought after clarification and the court’s failure to provide it constituted reversible error, which warrants the grant of a new trial.
. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 406, 50 P.S. § 7406 (Supp. 1980-81).