observing "strict” rule that requires proof "sufficient to eliminate the possibility of ... surmise or conjecture”
How later courts described this case
- observing "strict” rule that requires proof "sufficient to eliminate the possibility of ... surmise or conjecture”
- noting, on a similar record, that "the testimony of value was not elicited in an ideal way”
- reversing grand larceny conviction when government offered no evidence concerning condition of stolen items
- describing television and radio as “items subject to fairly prompt depreciation”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
Appellants contend that because there was a lack of direct proof that the stolen items had an aggregate “value of $100 or upward,” D.C.Code § 22-2201 (1981), at the time of the theft, their motions for judgment of acquittal should have been granted. In passing upon such a motion, the trial judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and give it the benefit of all justifiable inferences which can be drawn therefrom. Further, when there is a possibility of convicting a defendant of either grand or petit larceny, depending upon the value of the stolen property, the government’s proof of value must provide a “firm basis” upon which the jury can reach a decision. United States v. Thweatt, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 127 , 433 F.2d 1226, 1233 (1970).
In the present case, the. testimony of value was not elicited in an ideal way. Nonetheless, the complainant and her daughter testified that a china closet, lamps, and television had been stolen. The daughter also stated that the 19-inch color television had been purchased for approximately $600 one year earlier, and the three-year-old china closet had originally cost $225. 1 Given the purchase price and number of items named in the indictment, it is evident that their value at the time of the theft was sufficiently above the $100 minimum so as to remove that issue from the realm of speculation. In re J.F.T., 320 A.2d 322, 325 (D.C.1974). 2 Indeed, the very *682 effort needed to take and carry away so many bulky items is a good indication that their value exceeded $100. In my view, the trial court correctly overruled defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal, as there was ample evidence from which the jury could draw a legitimate inference that the stolen items were worth at least $100 and more likely above that amount.
Accordingly, I dissent to the reversals of the convictions for grand larceny.
. These witnesses were competent to testify as to value, as the "market value of a chattel ... may be established by the testimony of its non-expert owner,” Moore v. United States, 388 A.2d 889, 891 (D.C.1978) (quoting In re R.D.J., 348 A.2d 301, 304 (D.C.1975)).
. This case is unlike either United States v. Thweatt, supra, or Boone v. United States, 296 A.2d 449 (D.C.1972). In Thweatt , the stolen property included a typewriter with an estimated market value of 555, a four-year-old suit which had originally been purchased for $38, and three shirts purchased for $12 four years earlier. There, the court found that the jury would have to speculate as to the items’ value. Thweatt, supra, 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 126-27 , 433 F.2d at 1232-33 . Likewise, in Boone , where two sets of golf clubs costing $211 and $101 respec *682 tively had an estimated value of $50 each when stolen, this court viewed such evidence as requiring speculation. Boone, supra, 296 A.2d at 449-50 . Because the value of the stolen items in those cases approached the $100 statutory mark, "precision without speculation" was the rule correctly applied by the courts. See In re J.F.T., supra, 320 A.2d at 325 . We did not purport to set a minimum as to testimonial form before value can be established.