following Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-74, and holding that the “State’s right to the benefit of reasonable inferences cannot be used to reduce the State’s burden of establishing the essential elements of *131 the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
How later courts described this case
- following Jackson, supra, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-74, and holding that the “State’s right to the benefit of reasonable inferences cannot be used to reduce the State’s burden of establishing the essential elements of *131 the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”
- following Jackson v. Virginia and holding that "the State's right to the benefit of reasonable inferences cannot be used to reduce the State's burden of establishing the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt"
- "The Christener Court was sharply divided. I considered the majority's reasoning to be unsound and my conviction remains the same."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*576 SCHREIBER, J.,
concurring.
I concur fully in Justice Garibaldi’s opinion, except for a reservation concerning her discussion of State v. Christener, 71 N.J. 55 (1976). The Christener Court was sharply divided. I considered the majority’s reasoning to be unsound and my conviction remains the same.