holding “the ballot title clearly prevented “a fair understanding of the amendment and would give the voter ‘serious ground’ for reflection’ on whether to vote for the measure”
How later courts described this case
- holding “the ballot title clearly prevented “a fair understanding of the amendment and would give the voter ‘serious ground’ for reflection’ on whether to vote for the measure”
- holding “the ballot title clearly prevented a fair understanding of the amendment and would give the voter ‘serious grounds’ for reflection on whether to vote for the measure”
- emphasizing again our earlier request for the General Assembly to attempt to establish an initiative procedure that would permit early resolution of ballot-title issues
- 550-word title summarizing 20-page amendment with seventy-five subsections not invalid on length alone, but this factor plus serious omissions defeated title
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERT L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. Proposed Amendment 4 and Proposed Amendment 8 both authorize a state lottery, charitable bingo, and casino gambling. Proposed Amendment 4 authorizes three casino establishments in Hot Springs with one adjacent to the Oaklawn Racetrack. Proposed Amendment 8 authorizes casino gambling at five sites throughout the state, including the two existing pari-mutuel tracks, with six additional sites subject to local-option elections. This court has approved Proposed Amendment 4 for the ballot. Parker v. Priest, 326 Ark. 123 , 930 S.W.2d 322 (1996). It now enjoins placement of Proposed Amendment 8 on the ballot. I believe the people should have the right to choose between these competing proposals.
In the past, I have voted to strike misleading proposals from the ballot. See, e.g., Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241 , 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994) (the term “additional racetrack wagering” did not sufficiently inform the voters of casino gambling); Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277 , 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994) (misleading language on restriction of legal fees and omission of standard for review in workers’ compensation cases). The misleading tendency in those two cases was serious, and the omissions would have given voters a serious ground for reflection. Here, the deficiencies espoused by the majority do not approach that degree of significance.
I first question whether the ballot title is misleading with respect to sites for casino gambling in designated counties versus local-option counties. The ballot tide reads:
AUTHORIZING CASINO GAMBLING AS AN APPROPRIATE LAND USE BY LICENSEES APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION AT: ONE (1) PREVIOUSLY CHOSEN SPECIFIC SITE, AS SET FORTH BY LEGAL DESCRIPTION IN THIS AMENDMENT, IN EACH OF BOONE, GARLAND, AND CHICOT COUNTIES; THREE (3) ADDITIONAL LICENSES, ONE (1) IN PULASKI AT A PREVIOUSLY CHOSEN SITE SET FORTH BY LEGAL DESCRIPTION IN THIS AMENDMENT, ONE (1) IN GARLAND AND ONE IN MILLER COUNTIES IF APPROVED BY COUNTY LOCAL OPTION ELECTIONS; THREE (3) AT-LARGE LICENSES IN ANY COUNTY IF APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION AND BY COUNTY LOCAL OPTION; AND AT THE TWO EXISTING PARIMUTUEL TRACKS AFTER NOVEMBER 1, 1998;
The language appears sufficiently clear and unambiguous. Casino gambling is approved in Boone, Garland, and Chicot Counties, as well as at the pari-mutuel tracks. It can also be approved in Pulaski, Garland (a second site), and Miller Counties by local-option elections, and at sites in three other counties, also by local-option elections. I do not see any confusion here.
Nor do the other deficiencies asserted qualify as misleading or as serious omissions:
— The ballot title does provide for a local-option election upon petition by 20% of the qualified voters in a county. That is a more stringent requirement than the general requirement of a petition by 15% of the voters contained in Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution. I see nothing amiss in requiring a stricter standard for calling local-option elections for casino gambling when the standard is disclosed in the ballot title.
— The ballot tide reveals state taxes on gross gambling revenue which the proposed amendment defines as revenue to the casino after winnings are paid out. This seems reasonable. Net revenue would be revenue remaining after ordinary expenses (rent, payroll, and so forth) are also deducted. I see nothing fatal to the ballot tide in 'his regard.
— Proposed Amendment 8 limits the number of casinos to eleven. Language in the proposed amendment allows casinos authorized in other constitutional amendments to be counted toward that total. The maximum number is still eleven. This effort to meld Proposed Amendment 8 to other proposals should not result in its elimination from the ballot. If there is an irreconcilable conflict between two amendments that pass, Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution provides that the one receiving the greater number of votes becomes law.
— The proposed amendment allows initial casino licensees to offer simulcast gambling immediately which Oaklawn Racetrack, at least, is now doing. Oaklawn and South-land must wait to offer casino gambling until November 1998. Presumably, the idea is that it will take time for the initial licensees to set up their operations, whereas Oak-lawn and Southland are already operational. The attempt appears to be to place all operators on an equal footing. I do not find this to be unreasonable or necessary for placement in the ballot title.
In short, I fail to see the serious deficiencies embraced by the majority. This is the first instance that I can find where one competing ballot issue was struck and one was left on the ballot. I am reluctant to leave Proposed Amendment 4 on the ballot and strike Proposed Amendment 8 under these circumstances, where the litany of deficiencies is so weak. This court has stated:
Our most significant rule is that in determining the sufficiency of the title we give a liberal construction and interpretation of the requirements of Amendment 7 in order to secure its purposes to reserve to the people the right to adopt, reject, approve, or disapprove legislation.
Gaines v. McCuen, 296 Ark. 513, 519 , 758 S.W.2d 403, 406 (1988) (emphasis in original); see also Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277 , 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994); Plugge v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 654 , 841 S.W.2d 139 (1992); Finn v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 418 , 798 S.W.2d 34 (1990).
I respectfully dissent.