The opinion
John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. It seems to me the majority opinion holds that a person, firm or corporation cannot be held liable for libel unless it is first proved that the publication or broadcast was not done with the specific intent of injuring the victim. I cannot agree with such a holding. All of the cases cited have held that when a matter was published with “actual malice” or “reckless disregard for the truth” punitive damages were allowable. In my opinion the majority has now overruled a long established principle of law and made it almost impossible to recover punitive damages in a libel suit.
The facts, as stated in the majority opinion, show conclusively that the story presented by the appellant was devoid of truth. There was no robbery attempt; there was no hostage; there were no arrests; and the police did not prevent a robbery. Everything in the report was untrue and unverified by the appellant. If this does not amount to a reckless disregard for the truth then it is difficult to imagine a case where this standard would exist.
Cases cited in the opinion were ones where there were more than one defendant; here there is only one defendant. There was no prejudice to any other defendants such as occurred in Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Padgett, 241 Ark. 353 , 407 S.W.2d 728 (1966) and Dalrymple v. Fields, 276 Ark. 185 , 633 S.W.2d 362 (1982). In the present case, the entire matter was properly presented to the jury.
Had the newscast not shown the appellees as the subjects of the telecast the damages might not have existed. However, appellees were clearly identified as two would-be robbers and kidnappers. This story was completely false. Without this telecast, few, if any, of appellees’ friends and acquaintances would have even heard of their brief detention by the police.
The First Amendment right of free speech and free press carries with it some responsibility. There is no freedom to falsely shout “fire” in a crowded theater. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Nor is there the freedom to injure innocent people through the broadcast of their faces on a widely viewed newscast when the facts in the story are unconfirmed, false and show an utter disregard for standards within the news reporting profession to an extent that is easily recognizable as reckless. A jury of twelve properly found that this was the case and subsequently awarded compensatory damages to appellees. To abrogate the prior law on this subject is to do a considerable disservice to all residents of this court’s jurisdiction, each of whom is now a potential victim of irresponsible journalism. This does an even greater disservice to the news media itself, for without the reasonable constraints provided for under our previous law, the temptation will be ever present to be less diligent in efforts to confirm the truthfulness of a newsmaking story. Freedom of the press may be abused and I sincerely believe it was in this case. At least the issue of whether the story was broadcast with “actual malice” or “reckless disregard for the truth” was a matter properly presented to the jury. Finding no other errors, I would affirm the trial court.