explaining that the trial judge has “wide latitude” to “limit reasonably a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness ‘based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the trial judge has “wide latitude” to “limit reasonably a criminal defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness ‘based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant”
- evidence that 12-year-old sexual abuse complainant had previously been removed from mother’s home and placed in home of defendant after she was sexually abused by mother’s paramour, was admissible to support defendant’s contention that complainant fabricated sexual abuse allegations against him because she wanted to be removed from defendant’s home in order to avoid harsh discipline by defendant’s wife
- evidence is relevant if it supports a reasonable inference regarding the existence of a material fact
- other evidence to challenge credibility of victim does not suggest reason for victim to show hostility towards defendant which would manifest itself in sexual abuse claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting.
I fail to find an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal and remand for a new trial. I believe that evidence of the child’s victimization by her mother’s paramour and the *633 ultimate conviction of the assailant is irrelevant to this case and was properly excluded by the trial court.
It is difficult enough for victims of sexual assault to relive the* traumatic events of the assault which is being prosecuted. To force a victim to recount an assault for which a separate perpetrator has already been tried and convicted would discourage serial victims from bringing forth allegations. One of the purposes of the Rape Shield Law may be to protect against “overly zealous defense attorneys,” as the majority points out, but it was also enacted to limit evidence to that which is relevant to the assault being tried.
I believe this case is indistinguishable from Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 372 Pa.Super. 566 , 539 A.2d 1341 (1988), in which this Court rejected appellant/defendant’s attempt to introduce evidence of the victim’s sexual history as relevant to the victim’s motive for bringing charges against her assailant. What the appellant in this case wanted to prove was that the child had a poor relationship with her aunt and that she fabricated the charges because she wanted to be removed from the aunt’s household. There was ample evidence offered at trial from which the jury could have drawn this conclusion if it had found such a conclusion proper; therefore, evidence of the prior assaults and their eventual conviction would have been more prejudicial than probative.
Accordingly, I dissent.