The opinion
CIRILLO, Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In so doing, I adopt the dissenting opinion of Judge Wieand; I also wish to point out some further considerations.
Like my brethren, I am fully aware of our subordinate role as an intermediate court. Certainly, we are not free to haphazardly distinguish a controlling case from the one before us simply because we might blanch at the outcome of its application as precedent. If stare decisis is to remain *54 a viable stabilizer in our decision making process, this Court must abide whenever possible by Supreme Court mandates.
However, it does not follow that a potentially controlling decision may not be distinguished when it cannot be reconciled with other important changes in the law. The majority ably discusses the difficulty a defamation plaintiff faces in proving his case in light of New York Times v. Sullivan ’s “actual malice” standard. Realizing that this onerous burden is multiplied by Taylor’s broad interpretation of the Shield Law, my brethren nonetheless sadly conclude, in the name of judicial tidiness, that we may not distinguish Taylor merely because it is “old law”. This conclusion is based on two premises: a) Taylor was decided in 1963, yet in 1968 the Shield Law was amended without changing the language “source of any information”, thus retaining its original meaning pursuant to 1 P.C.S. § 1922, and b) despite its vintage, Taylor’s holding has retained its vitality through recent federal court decisions which interpret Pennsylvania law.
The amendment to the Shield Law in 1968 brought employees of the wire services and electronic media within its purview; I interpret this as an intent to keep the law compatible with the ever-changing relationship between the media and its public. Further, 1 P.C.S. § 1922 also provides that the General Assembly does not intend an unreasonable result as a matter of statutory interpretation. Given the increased pleading burdens imposed by New York Times v. Sullivan, which was decided after Taylor, the Shield Law as interpreted in Taylor is now clearly unreasonable. In other words, I would distinguish Taylor not simply because it is old, but because other developments in the interim have stripped it of its precedential effect. Stare decisis is an important concept, but not an unyielding one.
Further, I do not agree that recent federal court reliance on Taylor has maintained the validity of that decision so far as this Court is concerned. The failure of those courts to distinguish Taylor based on its shortcomings does not negate the existence of the distinction. Decisions of lower *55 federal courts are persuasive, but are not binding upon us. See generally 1 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 2:131. To the extent we look to those cases for guidance, we might also look to those well-reasoned opinions in other jurisdictions which have either simply adopted more restrictive shield laws or explicitly rejected Taylor in doing so.
In sum, I conclude that the development in the law since Taylor, as recognized by the majority, constitutes an important distinction between that case and the one before us. Stare decisis was never intended as a vehicle for the perpetuation of bad law. I would affirm subject to the modification suggested by Judge Wieand.