providing that the official records of the Supreme Court of Texas are public records
How later courts described this case
- providing that the official records of the Supreme Court of Texas are public records
- discussing the duration of an attorney’s admission to the State Bar of Texas in terms of eligibility
- Supreme Court mandamus review available for election mandamus based on its “statewide application,” "urgency of time constraints,” and potential for the case to become moot without immediate attention
- “We have repeatedly recognized the principle that constitutional provisions which restrict the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION
GONZALEZ, Justice.
This is an election mandamus. The issue is whether the requirement in article V, section 2 of the Texas Constitution that a candidate for the supreme court be a lawyer for at least ten years must be satisfied by the day of the general election or by the time service in office begins.
Relator Ross Sears, a candidate in the Democratic primary for Justice, Place 2, Supreme Court of Texas, filed this petition for writ of mandamus. He is asking us to order respondent Fred Meyer, Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, to declare Lamar McCorkle, a candidate in the Repub *249 lican primary for Justice, Supreme Court of Texas, Place 2, ineligible. Sears is also requesting that we order Meyer to exclude McCorkle’s name from the Republican primary ballot for 1990, and order Respondent George Bayoud, the Texas Secretary of State, not to certify McCorkle as the nominee for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. Two other candidates for the Democratic Party’s nomination for place 2, Bob Gammage and C.L. (Scrappy) Holmes, have adopted Sears’ pleadings and join in his prayer for relief. Respondent Fred Meyer filed a Motion to Dismiss urging that jurisdiction is not proper in this court.
JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition and to issue the writ by virtue of the Texas Election Code, section 273.061, which provides:
Jurisdiction
The supreme court or a court of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election or a political party convention, regardless of whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public officer
Tex.Elec.Code § 273.061 (Vernon 1986), and section 161.009, which provides:
Party Officer Subject to Mandamus The performance of a duty placed by this code on an officer of a political party is enforceable by writ of mandamus in the same manner as if the party officer were a public officer.
Tex.Elec.Code § 161.009 (Vernon 1986).
Respondents contend that this court does not have jurisdiction, asserting that Texas Election Code, section 273.063(a), and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 121(a)(1) require a mandamus proceeding to first be filed in the court of appeals. Section 273.-063(a) of the Election Code does not require that an original petition for writ of mandamus be filed in the court of appeals prior to filing in the supreme court. Section 273.-063 concerns venue and merely provides in which court of appeals district the petition must be filed if the relator chooses to file in the court of appeals.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 121(a)(1) provides:
When the court of appeals is authorized to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over an original proceeding, the motion should first be presented to the court of appeals. The motion for leave to file in the supreme court shall state the date of presentation of the petition to the court of appeals and that court’s action on the motion or petition or the compelling reason that a motion was not first presented to the court of appeals.
Tex.R.App.P. 121(a)(1) (emphasis added). The rule does not stand as an absolute bar to the filing of a petition in the supreme court without having first filed in the court of appeals. See also Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256 , 28 S.W.2d 515, 520-21 (1930); Westervelt v. Yates, 145 Tex. 38 , 194 S.W.2d 395 (1946); Stanford v. Butler, 142 Tex. 692 , 181 S.W.2d 269 (1944); Burroughs v. Lyles, 142 Tex. 704 , 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944). In Thiel v. Harris County Democratic Executive Committee, 534 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.1976), we granted a petition for writ of mandamus directing the Harris County Democratic Committee to exclude from the primary ballot the name of a candidate for state representative. In Thiel , we reiterated the general rule now embodied in rule 121(a)(1): “[ojrdinarily the Court encourages that relief of this nature be sought in the court of civil appeals.” Id. at 895 . We then explained that the petition was entertained because the matter involved was of “statewide application” and additionally because there was a conflicting court of appeals decision involving different parties. Id.
In his motion for leave to file petition for writ of mandamus, Sears asserts that the issue before the court is of “statewide application.” He additionally states that “the urgency of the time constraints” necessitates immediate review by this court. His motion states that if this dispute is not resolved by final judgment before the be *250 ginning of absentee balloting, it may become moot by virtue of section 141.034 of the Election Code, which provides that “[a]n application for a place on the ballot may not be challenged for [non]compliance with the applicable requirements as to form and procedure after the day before the beginning of absentee voting by personal appearance. . . .” Tex.Elec.Code § 141.034 (Vernon 1986). Absentee voting for the primary has not yet started. We conclude that Sears has complied with rule 121(a)(1). 1
. This case falls within the narrow exception in rule 121(a)(1) permitting a mandamus proceeding to be filed in the Supreme Court without having first been filed in the court of appeals. Ordinarily, where jurisdiction is concurrent, a mandamus proceeding should first be presented to the court of appeals.