stating, "In sum, the wording of Article V, § 12(b), that provides 'an indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an offense; an information is a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense,' abolishes the former prerequisites to which the referred to charging instruments must adhere, lest they fail as charging instruments, at least from the standpoint of Art. V, Section 12.”
How later courts described this case
- stating, "In sum, the wording of Article V, § 12(b), that provides 'an indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an offense; an information is a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense,' abolishes the former prerequisites to which the referred to charging instruments must adhere, lest they fail as charging instruments, at least from the standpoint of Art. V, Section 12.”
- holding that a charging instrument may be an indictment as contemplated by the Texas constitution even if fails to charge each element of an offense
- setting out the history of appellate reversals for indictment flaws and citing comments by Senator Ike Harris: "What this basically does . . . it's a bill that deals with that problem that has plagued the criminal justice system and the Court of Criminal Appeals over a number of years, that involves a defective indictment which a defense goes to trial upon, makes no objection, then raises on appeal for the first time, then the court reverses, based upon that defect in the indictment and the lower court has never had the opportunity to rule upon that question. There are a number of cases that have been reversed on those technicalities."
- setting out pri- or cases and noting that, before the 1985 constitutional and legislative changes, "[a] substance defect was considered ‘fundamental error' since a charging instrument with such a defect failed to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and any conviction had upon that instrument was therefore void. Also apparent from the caselaw is that this Court has used the terms ‘substance defect,' ‘fundamental error,’ and ‘fatally defective' interchangeably when addressing errors in charging instruments which led to void convictions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Murk, 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 75 (1991)
Studer and the instant case are distinguishable, but only in that the indictment in Murk became objectionable (lack of culpable mental state) to the appellant on the day of trial, not before the date on which trial commences as contemplated in Article 1.14(b), Y.A.C.C.P.
The opinion
TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring.
Because my vote to join the majority opinion by Judge Miller might be misconstrued in some quarters, I write this short concurring opinion.
My understanding of the majority opinion, as far as the State pleading an offense against the accused since Art. V, § 12, Texas Constitution, was amended, is that it is now permissible for the State to plead “bare-bones.” For example, in charging the offense of murder, it is now necessary for the State only to plead the conclusion that the accused committed the offense of murder in such and such county on such and such date, without alleging any facts regarding the murder. Although I cannot imagine any prosecuting attorney of this State willing to plead “bare-bones,” that is the perogative of the prosecuting attorneys of this State. However, I cannot imagine any competent defense attorney not filing a motion to quash the indictment in that instance. Thus, it appears to me that, if anything, the Constitutional Amendment will, from a practical standpoint, cause more work to be hoisted on our now overworked trial judges, if prosecuting attorneys plead “bare-bones.” I would suggest to prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, and trial judges, that if the State desires to plead “bare-bones,” and the de *301 fendant and his attorney are going to enter into a plea bargain ■ agreement, which agreement is going to be accepted by the trial judge, that the indictment be replaced with an information, and then the indictment be dismissed on motion of the State.
With these brief remarks, I join the majority opinion by Judge MILLER.