recognizing that many jurisdictions have adopted a clear and convincing standard and concluding: “We believe the goal of limiting punitive damage awards in the context of products liability litigation is best served by focusing on tjie nature of the defendant’s conduct instead of increasing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion.”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that many jurisdictions have adopted a clear and convincing standard and concluding: “We believe the goal of limiting punitive damage awards in the context of products liability litigation is best served by focusing on tjie nature of the defendant’s conduct instead of increasing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion.”
- holding that knowledge of general safety risks posed by asbestos was not enough to show subjective appreciation of the specific risks faced by insulation workers installing asbestos
- refusing to address the burden of 1098 n.14 (Pa. 1985) (Hutchinson, J., delivering proof in punitive damages cases because “the the judgment of the court and an opinion joined by parties have not briefed or argued the issue, nor only one o f the five remaining justices) have the courts belo w addressed it”
- distinguishing Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir.1973) and Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Inc., 548 F.Supp. 357 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff'd sub nom. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 521 Pa. 97 (1989)
494 A.2d 1088, 1093-94 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800
Distinguished
Distinguished by Brown v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 35 F.3d 717 (1994)
In Paoli I, we distinguished Martin by saying that:
The opinion
McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring.
In his Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, Mr. Justice Hutchinson correctly notes that:
“the quality of evidence here presented makes it unnecessary and inappropriate for us to consider either the broad policy arguments or the legal theory the parties present supporting a blanket rule for or against the allowance of punitive damages in litigation involving mass-marketed products.”
At 164-168. In light of this fact it is wholly unnecessary to plunge headlong into a dissertation on the various nuances of punitive damages in Pennsylvania. However, since the issue has been raised I must take issue with the implication that wanton misconduct may not be sufficient grounds upon which to assess punitive damages.
The concept of wanton misconduct was defined by this Court in Evans v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 418 Pa. 567 , 212 A.2d 440 (1965):
[It] means that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.
Id., 418 Pa. at 574 , 212 A.2d at 443 .
Thereafter, in Fugagli v. Camasi, 426 Pa. 1 , 229 A.2d 735 (1967) the Court wrote:
*179 [It] is not necessary for the tortfeasor to have actual knowledge of the other person’s peril to constitute wanton misconduct. Such exists if he has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable man to realize the existing danger for a sufficient period of time beforehand to give him a reasonable opportunity to take means to avoid the danger and, despite this knowledge, he recklessly ignores the other person’s peril. (Citation omitted.)
Id., 426 Pa. at 3 , 229 A.2d at 736 .
In Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa.Super. 35 , 268 A.2d 157 (1970) the Superior Court relied upon these principles to approve the imposition of punitive damages against a defendant who was found liable for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. That court noted that “[in] certain factual circumstances the risk to others ... may be so obvious and the possibility that harm will follow so great that outrageous misconduct may be established without reference to motive or intent.” Id., 217 Pa.Superior Ct. at 41, 268 A.2d at 161 .
Now however, Mr. Justice Hutchinson, joined by Mr. Justice Flaherty, seems to decide, in a vacuum no less, that punitive damages are inappropriate “where the actor has such knowledge, or reason to know of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man would do so.” at 170-171.
In light of accepted definition of wanton misconduct Fugagli, supra, Evans, supra, such a decision contradicts what we said in Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383 , 485 A.2d 742 (1984), to wit: “[p]unitive damages must be based on conduct which is ‘malicious’ ‘wanton ’ ‘reckless’ ‘willful’ or ‘oppressive’____” Id., 506 Pa. at 383 , 485 A.2d at 742 (emphasis added). See Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475 , 37 A.2d 551 (1944).
Therefore, I concur in the result only.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins in this concurring opinion.