counsel was not ineffective in failing to assert insufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction of felony murder where forensic pathologist had testified that stress caused by defendant’s robbery and kidnapping of victim aggravated victim’s arteriosclerotic heart disease, resulting in his death
How later courts described this case
- counsel was not ineffective in failing to assert insufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction of felony murder where forensic pathologist had testified that stress caused by defendant’s robbery and kidnapping of victim aggravated victim’s arteriosclerotic heart disease, resulting in his death
- NCIC computer check of license which revealed that vehicle was stolen and used in a criminal act and that occupants were armed was sufficient in and of itself to justify warrantless arrest of appellant
- sustaining conviction of second-degree murder in case where victim died of cardiac arrest four hours after being kidnaped and robbed by petitioner
- where arresting officer was informed by radio dispatch that an NCIC check revealed appellant’s vehicle was stolen and used in a criminal act and occupants were armed, the information was sufficient in and of itself to justify the warrantless arrest of appellant
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that there is at least arguable merit to appellant’s contention that trial counsel should have prevented the jury from learning about the unrelated crimes for which appellant was arrested in Atlantic City. I am unable to agree, however, that the introduction of evidence of unrelated criminal activity was harmless. See generally: Commonwealth v. Martinez, 301 Pa.Super. 121 , 447 A.2d 272 (1982). Therefore, I would remand for an *137 evidentiary hearing limited to counsel’s stewardship regarding the introduction of evidence of unrelated criminal activity. By an evidentiary hearing it can be determined whether the course chosen by counsel had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate the interests of his client. If there was such a reasonable basis, the judgment of sentence should be affirmed. If not, appellant should be awarded a new trial.
In all other respects I agree with and join Judge McEWEN’s careful analysis and disposition.