The opinion
DONNELLY, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the principal opinion but desire to direct attention to relatively recent expressions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on problems relating to guilty pleas.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is quite similar to our Rule 25.04. Rule 11 reads as follows:
“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo con-tendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is quite similar to our Rule 27.25. Rule 32(d) reads as follows:
“(d) Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.”
In United States v. Cody, 8 Cir., 438 F.2d 287 (1971), the Court attached as an appendix to its opinion, with apparent approval, a recommended procedure for conducting a guilty plea proceeding. If adapted to Missouri, it could read substantially as follows: If defendant’s plea is guilty:
[V.A.M.R. 25.04; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).]
a. before accepting plea:
(1) ascertain and make finding that defendant :
(a) is acting voluntarily (if in doubt, consider whether the defendant should be given a mental examination, V.A. M.S. § 552.020);
*536 (b) fully understands his rights;
(c) fully understands the consequences of his plea;
(d) is in fact guilty;
(2) explain and ask defendant if he understands :
(a) that the court need not accept his plea unless satisfied of defendant’s guilt and that defendant fully understands his rights;
(b) that if he pleads not guilty he would be entitled to a speedy and public trial by a judge or jury;
(c) that at such trial the State would have to confront him with the witnesses upon whose testimony it relied to obtain a conviction, and he would have the right to cross-examine these witnesses ;
(d) that at such trial he would be presumed innocent until such time, if ever, as the State established his guilt by competent evidence to the satisfaction of the judge or jury beyond a reasonable doubt;
(e) that at such trial he would be entitled to compulsory process to call witnesses ;
(f) the nature and essential elements of the charge to which he is pleading;
(g) the range of penalties to which he is subjecting himself by his plea including the maximum sentence;
(3) ask defendant:
(a) if any threats or promises have been made to induce him to plead guilty;
(b) if he believes there is any understanding or if any predictions have been made to him concerning the sentence he will receive;
(c) if he committed the offense;
(d) just what he did (obtain admission of necessary acts, knowledge, and intent) ;
(e) if he still wishes to plead guilty;
(f) any additional questions required by the circumstances.
(4)ask defense counsel if he knows any reason why defendant should not plead guilty;
b. accept or reject plea;
c. if plea is rejected, or if defendant refuses to plead, enter a plea of not guilty and set date for trial;
d. if plea is accepted, enter an order finding that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge, and is therefore accepted.
On May 18, 1971, in State of Missouri v. Turley, 8 Cir., 443 F.2d 1313, at 1318 , the Court expressed itself as follows:
“This Court has recently considered the duties of a Federal District Court Judge under Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 11 when accepting a guilty plea. See United States v. Rawlins, 440 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Woosley, 440 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cody, 438 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1971). Rule 11 is, of course, not applicable in state proceedings. Nevertheless, once it has been established that a state court has, at the time of accepting a guilty plea, elicited sufficient information from the parties so that the propriety of accepting the plea is established in a manner analogous to the dictates of Rule 11, and an adequate record is made thereof, the occasion for setting aside a guilty plea should seldom arise. United States v. Rawlins, supra. The ascertaining of such information and the recording thereof are not exercises in futility. United States v. Woosley, supra.
“It is worthy of note here that a minority of the Justices of the Supreme Court have indicated that in that minority’s estimation, the Supreme Court has in effect fastened *537 upon the states, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the requirements of Rule 11. Fed.R.Crim.P. See Mr. Justice Harlan, whom Mr. Justice Black joins, dissenting in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 245 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). It appears from the majority opinion in Boy-kin that an on the record examination conducted by the trial court accepting a guilty plea which includes, inter alia, an attempt by that Court to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to trial by jury, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences is sufficient to insulate the plea from subsequent attack in collateral proceedings. See Boykin v. Alabama, supra, at 244, note 7 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 .”
This language is extremely significant because, at least in my opinion, it invites the trial judges of Missouri to utilize a procedure which could insulate most guilty pleas from successful subsequent attack in Rule 27.25 and 27.26 proceedings, and in federal habeas corpus proceedings.