holding that “changes in the laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause.” (double emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “changes in the laws governing parole may violate the ex post facto clause.” (double emphasis in original)
- explaining that to demonstrate ex post facto violation under Garner and Morales , inmate must show that under previous parole law, "the Board would likely have paroled the inmate."
- conceding that the General Assembly “intended to ensure that those convicted of second-degree murder are never to be released on parole.”
- where a petitioner seeks mandamus relief predicated upon an ex post facto violation made out through statistical proofs, dismissal is appropriate if the petitioner fails to plead his statistical evidence with sufficient specificity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with the majority’s disposition on the merits of this case, I see no reason to overturn the ex post facto jurisprudence settled merely one year ago by Finnegan v. Board of Prob. & Parole, 576 Pa. 59 , 838 A.2d 684 (2003). There, this Court explicitly held: “We reiterate that the 1996 revision of § 331.1 of the Parole Act does not violate the ex post facto clause when applied to a prisoner convicted prior to the revision.” Id., at 690. This holding answered the exact question now presented, and, in accordance with stare decisis, deserves proper recognition. See Hall v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 578 Pa. 245 , 851 A.2d 859, 861 (2004) (“the resolution of this matter turns on the principles of separation of powers and stare decisis, rather than the substantive arguments raised by [appellant].”); Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 543 Pa. 578 , 673 A.2d 898 , 903 n. 9 (1996)(“The rule of stare decisis declares that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially similar, even though the parties may be different.”).
In Finnegan , this Court considered Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 , 120 S.Ct. 1362 , 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000), and California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 , 115 S.Ct. *52 1597 , 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995), the cases now said to be inconsistent with Finnegan . We held the 1996 Parole Act amendments passed federal constitutional muster. We noted that “[although the phrases ‘protects the safety of the public’ and ‘assist in the fair administration of justice’ were added in 1996, these concepts have always been underlying concerns [in the parole system].” Finnegan , at 688. Since the 1996 amendment merely “clarified” the current policy without changing it, no ex post facto argument is sustainable. With the ink from Finnegan not yet dry, the majority’s attempt to overturn it is likewise unsustainable.
Justice CASTILLE and Justice NEWMAN join this concurring and dissenting opinion.