concluding that because the legislature has chosen the intestate method of distribution of wrongful death proceeds, court must follow the mandates of the act
How later courts described this case
- concluding that because the legislature has chosen the intestate method of distribution of wrongful death proceeds, court must follow the mandates of the act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Pomeeoy:
Were this a case of first impression and were we writing on a clean slate, I would feel compelled to hold, *527 as the court today does hold, that “we cannot disturb the plain meaning of [wrongful death] Act” and substitute some other method of distribution. The language of the Act is clear and unambiguous that the scheme of intestate distribution shall be followed; it is not necessary that the distributees be dependents of the deceased or shall have otherwise sustained pecuniary loss by his death.
The fact is, however, that for ninety years this court has read the Act with a judicial gloss which adds pecuniary loss as an essential ingredient to recovery for wrongful death. Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. 95 (1882), and the subsequent cases cited in the court’s opinion; Siidekum v. Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408 , 45 A. 2d 59 (1946); Lewis v. Hunlock’s Creek and Muhlenhurg Turnpike Company, 203 Pa. 511 , 53 Atl. 349 (1902). It is no answer to say that the deprived beneficiaries in those cases suffered no loss whatever by the death of their decedents, whereas the minor daughter here sustained a slight loss—slight because limited by the support agreement. That is a distinction without a difference.
Adherence to the principles of sta/re decisis, accordingly, enjoins us to hold that the daughter here is not entitled to share equally with her stepmother in the proceeds of this recovery, but only in proportion to her loss. This is not, as the majority fears, “to rewrite the provision of the Wrongful Death Act which incorporates the Intestate Act”; the rewriting, if such it was, was done long ago. The legislature has not seen fit to alter the statutory language to correct the “erroneous” judgment of this court in the cases cited. This is a factor which we may now legitimately consider in deciding what meaning to give today to the language in question. See the Statutory Construction Act, May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, art. IY, §51, 46 P.S. §551; Philadel *528 phia Tax Review Board v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 437 Pa. 197, 210-11 , 262 A. 2d 135 (1970) (Jones and Pomeroy, JJ., dissenting, and cases cited therein). The legislature, by its silence, is presumptively satisfied with the equitable considerations which led the court long ago to avoid the absurd results ordained by too literal a reading of the statutory provision here involved. It is as unnecessary as it is unwise for us now to overrule decisions which have been acquiesced in by the legislature and have guided the lower courts in their decrees of distribution for three generations.
For the reasons indicated, I dissent from the opinion of the court, and join in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts.