holding that follow up questions regarding juror's friends and family involved in law enforcement or judicial system are "common areas of inquiry in a jury voir dire" and "do not fall ... within the categories of `controversial matters requiring careful inquiry.'"
How later courts described this case
- holding that follow up questions regarding juror's friends and family involved in law enforcement or judicial system are "common areas of inquiry in a jury voir dire" and "do not fall ... within the categories of `controversial matters requiring careful inquiry.'"
- holding that follow up questions regarding juror’s Mends and family involved in law enforcement or judicial system are “common areas of inquiry in a jury voir dire ” and “do not fall .. .within the categories of ‘controversial matters requiring careful inquiry.’ ”
- "The primary duty of the court in the voir dire is to discover those jurors who must be dismissed for cause ... and 'to permit counsel to satisfy themselves that they have an impartial jury’ ” (citations omitted)
- “The primary duty of the courts in the voir dire is to discover those jurors who must be dismissed for cause ... and 'to permit counsel to satisfy themselves that they have an impartial jury’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TERRY, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
My colleagues hold that, on the facts of this case, the voir dire of jurors 245 and 218 “was at least minimally sufficient and within the range of the trial court’s broad discretion.” Ante at 123. With all respect, I cannot agree.
It is beyond dispute that a defendant’s right to exclude any prospective juror by means of a peremptory challenge is “one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused_ Any system for the em-panelling of a jury that pre[v]ents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned.” Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 , 14 S.Ct. 410, 414 , 38 L.Ed. 208 (1894) (citations omitted). “Hence, where the trial judge frustrates the defendant’s ‘effective use’ of peremptory challenges, the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice to obtain reversal of a conviction.” Wells v. United States, 515 A.2d 1108, 1111 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted). In my view, the trial court’s refusal in this case to allow defense counsel to ask further questions of two prospective jurors requires reversal under Wells and Swain v. *125 Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 , 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (“The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice”), overruled in part on other grounds, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
There is simply no justification for the trial court’s saying to defense counsel, “All right, pick your best two.” The court’s comments that further questioning of the venire was “time-consuming” and that “time [was] at a premium” cannot excuse the infringement of appellant’s fundamental right to the effective exercise of her peremptory challenges. “The voir dire in American trials tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise of peremptories, and the process of selecting a jury protracted.” Swain v. Alabama, supra, 380 U.S. at 218-219 , 85 S.Ct. at 835 . Although the court has considerable discretion in conducting the voir dire in any trial, it may not curtail the voir dire simply to save five or ten minutes, as it did here. I would hold that the court’s action was arbitrary and capricious, and beyond the permissible limits of its discretion, because it impaired appellant’s right to the effective use of her peremptory challenges. That is enough, under Wells and Swain , to compel a reversal of her conviction.
Accordingly, I dissent.