stating that the severance of claims for trial is permissible if the suit involves multiple causes of action, the claims can be independently asserted, and the claims are not so interwoven as to involve the same facts and issues
How later courts described this case
- stating that the severance of claims for trial is permissible if the suit involves multiple causes of action, the claims can be independently asserted, and the claims are not so interwoven as to involve the same facts and issues
- holding that “the court [may not] deny a potential litigant the right to intervene if there has been no objection to intervention based on sufficient cause”
- holding that “the court [may not] deny a potential litigant the 8 second amended petition has not been struck, nor has any such motion been filed against it. (Appellees’ Br. at p. 12-13, n. 2
- holding that party opposed to intervention has the burden to challenge with motion to strike, and that trial court abuses its discretion if it strikes intervention in the absence of a motion to strike
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MAUZY, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s disposition of University Savings, but I respectfully dissent from the decision in Guaranty Federal. In my view, the record in Guaranty Federal shows plainly that the “official check” involved there was an executed sale of credit and was not subject to rescission and countermand under the facts presented. I agree with the court of appeals that
it blinks reality for the courts not to treat ... an “official check” [sold for a two-dollar fee] of a savings and loan association in Texas as the equivalent of cash. Too much of the personal and commercial business of this State is transacted with such checks with the expectation that they do represent cash. Certainly Guaranty considered that this “official check” was the equivalent of a cashier’s check and thus was delivered as the equivalent of cash. In this connection, the record contains various evidence indicating that Guaranty treated its “official check” as analogous to a cashier’s check. [One of Guaranty’s vice presidents, David] Liner repeatedly referred to the “official check” as a cashier’s check and a bank money order. On deposition, Liner testified as follows:
[Horseshoe’s Attorney]: Would you tell the Court and the jury just what the purpose is for an official check application?
[Liner]: It’s where the person comes in and gives us cash or good funds to issue a check to someone in their behalf. We use these as official checks or money orders instead of issuing a regular check.
Further, the record contains a computer printout regarding the $900,000.00 check which specifically refers to the check as a'“money order writer.” The record also contains a copy of the debit/credit transfer form used by Guaranty, which bears the notation, “Stop pmt on cashiers check.” Harold Ruyle, Guaranty’s vice president in charge of security and regulations compliance, testified that the official check “could probably be categorized as a cashier’s check.” Ruyle referred to the check as a cashier’s check when asked whether he had discussed this particular check with anyone.
748 S.W.2d 525 -526.
Again, it must be emphasized that the record reflects that Guaranty charged Par-met a two-dollar fee for issuance of its “official check”, just as any bank would charge for the issuance of a cashier’s check. See J. Reitman, et al., Banking Law § 133.10 (1988). Plainly, both Parmet and Horseshoe had sufficient reason to rely on the savings and loan’s check being the equivalent of cash. Accordingly, I dissent. I would affirm the Court of Appeals in Guaranty Federal.
RAY and GONZALEZ, JJ., join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.