explaining that pre-DuBree “a mere public employee having no policy-making functions was not entitled to [a]ny immunity, whether it was absolute or conditional.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that pre-DuBree “a mere public employee having no policy-making functions was not entitled to [a]ny immunity, whether it was absolute or conditional.”
- perceiving “no principled basis for differentiating between public defenders and privately retained and paid counsel” to conclude that public defenders were not entitled to the same immunities from suit as other publicly-funded employees
- declining to afford public defenders public official immunity; the public has an interest in ensuring the availability of court- appointed counsel to represent indigent criminal defendants, but once the appointment is made, a public defender’s public function ceases and he functions as a private attorney serving his client
- public defenders enjoy immunity for discretionary decisions taken in pursuance of their duties as public defenders
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANDERINO, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of Mr. Justice Nix except to the extent that it relies on Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355 , 93 A.2d 834 (1953), and suggests that a district attorney represents the sovereign in some way different from the public defender. Both the district attorney and the public defender are mandated by the sovereign to see that justice is done within the established rules of fairness. The district attorney, like the public defender, should not be controlled by anyone. The sovereign’s interest is served just as much when the public defender properly performs his duties as it is when the district attorney properly performs his. Both are independent entities whose duty is to see that the accused is treated fairly.