causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge
How later courts described this case
- causation established when hospital “prematurely” discharged mental patient who shot another some six weeks after discharge
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Although this Court’s decision in Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987) involved an interpretation of governmental immunity under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, it is instructive on the issue of whether the acts of third parties may impose liability upon a Commonwealth party by imputing the negligence of the third party to the Commonwealth party. Mascaro emphasized the importance of analyzing the precise language of the immunity statute itself in determining whether the legislative intent was to expose a governmental entity to liability. The statutory language is critical because exceptions to the rule of sovereign immunity must be narrowly interpreted given the expressed legislative intent to insulate Commonwealth parties from tort liability. See, Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 361 , 523 A.2d at 1123 .
The general immunity section of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, provides that “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to another or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” We stated in Mascaro , that acts of others are specifically excluded in the general immunity section and are nowhere discussed in the enumerated *530 exceptions to the statute. “... [A]ny harm that others cause may not be imputed to the local agency or its employees.” Mascaro, 514 Pa. at 363 , 523 A.2d at 1124 . Thus, acts of third parties will not impose liability upon a local agency even though those acts fall within the exceptions to the statute. It is only the acts of the local agency or its employees that will make the local agency amenable to suit.
The general rule governing sovereign immunity is that immunity is not waived except as provided in the statute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(a). The legislature has waived sovereign immunity in only nine specific instances for damages arising out of a negligent act where damages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person to whom sovereign immunity did not apply. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8522. Subsection (b) of § 8522 specifically provides that liability may be imposed on the Commonwealth for the “acts by a Commonwealth party ” that fall within the specific exceptions.
As in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, the sovereign immunity statute does not include any exception to the statute for the acts of others. The statute clearly limits the Commonwealth’s liability solely to acts by a Commonwealth party. The medical-professional liability exception provides that the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by “[a]cts of health care employees of Commonwealth agency medical facilities or institutions or by a Commonwealth party who is a doctor, dentist, nurse or related health care personnel.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8522(b)(2). This exception does not permit liability to be imposed on the Commonwealth due to the criminal conduct of a third party.
The majority improperly imputes liability to the Commonwealth based upon the harm caused by a third person, rather than a Commonwealth party. I agree with the Commonwealth Court that the medical-professional liability exception was intended to impose liability on the Commonwealth only for injuries suffered by patients and does not extend to injuries inflicted upon others by those patients. The majority’s expansive interpretation is at odds with our holding in *531 Mascaro that exceptions to the immunity statute must be narrowly interpreted. I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court.