stating that the state as sovereign is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued
How later courts described this case
- stating that the state as sovereign is immune from suit except as it consents to be sued
- “Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a) [requiring claimants to file written notice of claim with Division of Claims] is intended to make sure that the proper state officials receive notice of the claim to enable them to investigate the matter and to make a prompt administrative disposition of the claim.”
- “The time for pursuing a remedy against the State can be extended neither by filing an unauthorized suit in an unauthorized forum, nor by the application of the „Savings Statute‟ which does not specifically apply to claims against the State.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KOCH, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Peggy Brown’s claim against the State of Tennessee must be dismissed. Tenn. 'Code Ann. § 28-1-105 is intended to save otherwise valid claims from the statute of limitations. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Beasley & Beasley, 123 Tenn. 629, 631-32 , 134 S.W. 306 , 306 (1911). Ms. Brown’s claim is defective because it was not properly filed with the Division of Claims Administration.
State law imposes two conditions on persons desiring to pursue a claim against the State of Tennessee. Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a) (1987) requires that the claimant must give written notice to the Division of Claims Administration, and, as a result of a 1985 amendment, 1 Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-402(b) requires that the claim be filed within the time provided by the statute of limitations normally applicable to similar causes of action.
Each of these conditions serves an important purpose and is mandatory. Like other statutes of limitations, Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-402(b) is intended to prevent the filing of stale claims. Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a) is intended to make sure that the proper state officials receive notice of the claim to enable them to investigate the matter and to make a prompt administrative disposition of the claim.
The Division of Claims Administration did not receive Ms. Brown’s claim until over a year after the accident, and there is no independent evidence that the Division knew or should have known about the existence of the claim. Accordingly, I would find that Mrs. Brown’s claim could not pass muster under Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a) even if Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-105 saved it from the requirements of Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-402(b).
. Act of March 25, 1985, ch. 105, § 10, 1985 Tenn.Pub. Acts 154, 157.