construing the statutory predecessor to article 26.06 to "relieve a lawyer who is an elected county official from the duty of accepting such appointment, but not [to] preclude his serving if he chooses to do so"
How later courts described this case
- construing the statutory predecessor to article 26.06 to "relieve a lawyer who is an elected county official from the duty of accepting such appointment, but not [to] preclude his serving if he chooses to do so"
- lawyer was not disqualified for reason of being county judge from acting as attorney for an indigent defendant under court appointment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant urges that we distinguish his case from several opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States. We shall discuss the cases cited in his brief.
Martin v. Texas 200 U.S. 316 , 50 L. Ed. 497 , merely holds that the allegations in a motion to quash cannot be considered as proof of the discrimination claimed.
In Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 , 61 Sup. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 , there was a showing as to how many members of the colored race in the county measured up to the qualifications prescribed by the statute for grand jury service; in the case at bar there is no such showing. In Smith, there was proof that the names of the colored men who were drawn were systematically placed among the last names on the grand jury list and which, because of the practice of selecting the grand juries from the first names on the list, resulted in the exclusion of members of the colored race from grand jury service. In the case at bar there was no such showing. In Smith, there was proof of how many members of the colored race were selected as well as served. There is no such showing here.
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 , 62 Sup. Ct. 1159, 86 L .Ed. 1559, was reversed because it was there shown that no member of the colored race had been selected as a grand juror for sixteen years preceding the return of the indictment in that case. In the case at bar it was shown that three members of the colored race served on one grand jury, two on several occasions, one on others, and none on some.
In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 , 70 Texas Sup. Ct. 629, 94 L. Ed. 839 , there was proof that the jury commissioners made no effort to familiarize themselves with the qualifications of members of the colored race in their community. In the case at bar there was no such showing.
Ross v. Texas, 341 U.S. 918 , 71 Sup. Ct. 742, 95 L. Ed. 1352 , is a per curiam opinion which cites Cassell.
*509 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 , 74 Sup. Ct. 667, 98 L. Ed. 866 , is authority for the rule that persons of Mexican descent constituted a separate class of citizens from “whites” and, as such, must not be discriminated against in jury selection.
Though not cited, we do observe that in the recent case of Eubanks v. Louisiana, No. 550, Oct. Term, 1957, Sup. Ct. of U.S., delivered May 26, 1958, there was proof “that only one Negro had been picked for grand jury duty within memory” in Orleans Parish. The proof set forth above and in our original opinion clearly differentiates this case from Eubanks.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.