“As the foregoing discussion indicates, however, the office of president judge has no inherent constitutional powers, and the statutorily described powers are specifically made subject to exception by general rule or order of this Court. President Judge Blake has thus been deprived of no right or interest.”
How later courts described this case
- “As the foregoing discussion indicates, however, the office of president judge has no inherent constitutional powers, and the statutorily described powers are specifically made subject to exception by general rule or order of this Court. President Judge Blake has thus been deprived of no right or interest.”
- discussing Directive of April 14,1986
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The issue raised in the instant appeal requires that we harmonize the constitutional scheme conferring administrative and supervisory authority over the judicial system in this Court with the concurrent constitutional grant of administrative and supervisory power vested in the president judges of the various inferior courts within the unified judicial system. Article V, section 10 invests in this Court a “general supervisory and administrative authority over all the courts and justices of the peace____” See Article V, § 10(a). The Schedule to the judicial article, section 16(f), provides for the selection of president judges of the inferior courts and states that that officer “shall be the administrative head of the court and shall supervise the court’s judicial business.” 1 It is to be noted that the Schedule further provides “[t]he exercise of all supervisory and administrative powers detailed in Section 16 shall be subject to the supervisory and administrative control of the Supreme Court.” Article V, § 16(j).
Notwithstanding the clear primacy of the power conferred under Article V, § 10(a) over that vested in the *464 president judge under Article V, § 16(f), 2 see Article V, § 16(j), 3 it is fundamental that a constitutional grant of power may not be construed as being illusory. Thus there must be a legitimate basis articulated for this Court to intrude upon an area which is generally recognized as being within the administrative and supervisory authority of the president judge of the inferior court. The intent of the framers of our constitution to confer qualitatively different powers of control over the administrative and supervisory powers is further evidenced by the description of the power conferred in this Court as being a “general” one. This, in my judgment, was intended to limit the power vested in this Court to systemic concerns. In my view, the petitioners persuasively assert that this Court’s order of December 19, 1990 and the acts taken thereunder exceeded and violated the general supervisory and administrative authority vested in this Court.
The justification offered by a majority of the Court for the action taken is that
[i]n furtherance of that responsibility, this Court has for some time monitored the administration of the courts of Philadelphia with increasing unease. It was only after lengthy respite to allow the court to reform itself, with no appreciable improvement, that this Court ordered [two members of this Court] to exercise a more direct supervisory role.
Op. at pp. 458-459.
If these facts had been made part of the record in this matter, there might be justification for exercising the power *465 of this Court to remedy the situation. However, no record has been made of these alleged conditions. There is, therefore, no predicate of record upon which we can act. 4 If such a record had been established, I might agree that the actions taken were necessary. Under these circumstances, however, in which a majority of the Court justifies the Court's actions based on a factual predicate which, by its own design, the Court has prevented petitioners from challenging, I am constrained to dissent. By circumventing the customary procedure of briefing and argument, the Court has effectively foreclosed petitioners’ opportunity to contest the assertions upon which the majority’s decision rests.
Accordingly, I dissent.
McDERMOTT, J., joins this dissenting opinion.
. It is well established that provisions of the Schedule to the Constitution are to be given the same force and effect as the provisions contained in the main body of the Constitution. Noecker v. Woods, 259 Pa. 160 , 102 A. 507 (1917); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Heck, 251 Pa. 39 , 95 A. 929 (1915). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pattison, 109 Pa. 165 (1885).
. § 16. Courts and judges
(f) One of the judges of the court of common pleas shall be president judge and he shall be selected in the manner provided in section ten (d) of this article. He shall be the administrative head of the court and shall supervise the court's judicial business.
. § 16. Courts and judges
(j) The exercise of all supervisory and administrative powers detailed in this section sixteen shall be subject to the supervisory and administrative control of the Supreme Court.
. This assertion by the majority underscores the pertinence of the observations of Mr. Justice McDermott in criticizing the majority’s having truncated the normal procedure in this case.