Reyes v. State · 938 S.W.2d 718

stating that prior to Geesa v. State, this Court “employed the ‘reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence’ analytical construct to review the sufficiency of the evidence in circumstantial evidence cases”

How later courts described this case

stating that prior to Geesa v. State, this Court “employed the ‘reasonable-hypothesis-of-innocence’ analytical construct to review the sufficiency of the evidence in circumstantial evidence cases”
holding that Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), created "an absolute systemic requirement" that the jury be instructed on reasonable-doubt standard
stating that Geesa created an absolute systemic requirement that jury be instructed on reasonable-doubt standard
determining that Geesa created an absolute systemic requirement for instruction on reasonable doubt

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

Overruled by Paulson v. State, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 89 (2000)
938 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), overruled by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasOct 4, 20004 citing opinionsRead it
Overruled — as noted by 2 later courts
" We also overrule Reyes.
2 citing opinions
Overruled implicitly by Cain v. State, 1997 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (1997)
We should recognize that Cain effectively overruled Reyes, and we should erase all doubt about Reyes ’ status by expressly overruling it now.
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasJun 18, 1997impliedmedium confidenceRead it
Questioned by Taylor v. State, 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 9 (2000)
We express no opinion about the continued vitality of Reyes after Cain and State v. Toney, 979 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasJan 26, 2000Read it

Distinguished

Distinguished by Domingo Miranda v. State (1999)
charged offenses, we believe Reyes and Geesa are inapplicable.
Texas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)Apr 29, 1999Read it
Distinguished by State v. Toney, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 132 (1998)
There, we distinguished Reyes, since that case involved a total omission of the instruction on reasonable doubt, and was thus incapable of harm analysis.
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasOct 7, 1998Read it
Distinguished by Mann v. State, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 29 (1998)
” Reyes, supra, at 721. Reyes is distinguishable from the present case in that the court in Reyes totally omitted the instruction on reasonable doubt (and such omission was held by us to be incapable of harm analysis under either Almanza and Abdnor or Rule 81(b)(2) as being, in effect, structural error), whereas in the present case the jury was properly instructed as to reasonable doubt
Court of Criminal Appeals of TexasMar 11, 1998Read it
Distinguished by Mann v. State, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 5708 (1996)
Reyes, 938 S.W.2d at 720. Reyes is distinguishable from this case because here the trial court gave an incorrect instruction concerning reasonable doubt in one paragraph, but gave correct instructions in others.
Court of Appeals of TexasDec 12, 1996Read it

The opinion

MEYERS, Judge,

concurring.

The majority characterizes the submission of a reasonable doubt instruction as a systemic requirement that can neither be forfeited nor waived. Thus, the implementation of this requirement “cannot be avoided even with partisan consent” and, by necessary implication, a ease in which both parties requested that the reasonable doubt instruction not be given must be reversed on appeal. *722 Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Although somewhat troubling, this result cannot be avoided alter our unequivocal language in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Such a result may, however, compel a majority of this Court to reexamine Geesa in the future and, were that to happen, I might very weE join them in that endeavor.

With these remarks, I join the majority’s opinion.