describing the at-least-equal-fault approach, with reliance on Berman v. Coakley, 243 Mass. 348, 137 N.E. 667, 668 (1923)
How later courts described this case
- describing the at-least-equal-fault approach, with reliance on Berman v. Coakley, 243 Mass. 348, 137 N.E. 667, 668 (1923)
- describing the at-least-equal-fault approach, with reliance on Berman v. Coaldey, 243 Mass. 348, 137 N.E. 667, 668 (1923)
- “When the parties to a contract against public policy or otherwise illegal are not in pari delicto, or equally guilty, and when public policy is considered as advanced by allowing either, or at least the more excusable of the two, to sue, relief may be granted.” (quoting 8 P.L.E. § 109)
- describing the at-least-equal-fault approach
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell :
I disagree with the public policy rule enunciated by the majority. Contingent fees in both civil and criminal cases have, in my judgment, been greatly abused, with resulting grave injustice to clients who are poor, needy and/or injured. Especially is this so where an attorney charges a contingent fee of 30% to 50% in negligence cases in which the risk of loss, experience shows, is negligible. However, I regard the contingent fee as a necessity for a poor man. A poor man is entitled to representation by a lawyer of his choice, whom he considers able or very able. In many civil and criminal cases a poor person is unable to engage such a lawyer except on the basis of a contingent fee. Provided *96 such a fee is fair and reasonable, * I believe that realistically it is both proper and necessary.
With respect to the Board of Pardons, the Board requires, and for many years has required, the petitioner to state the fee which he has paid or has agreed to pay his attorney, and this would include a contingent fee or a fee partly paid and partly contingent. If the Board of Pardons considers the fee to be unfair to the client, or to indicate that it is being charged because of the attorney’s supposed influence with the Board of Pardons, the Board has the power to remedy the situation by refusing to hear the petition, or by refusing to permit that particular attorney to argue the case; and it probably has other disciplinary powers with respect to any improper or inordinate fee.
While the majority and I desire to achieve the same results, I cannot agree with them that a fair contingent fee in a Board of Pardons case is per se against public policy.
If the fee of $5,000 — contrary to the tenor of the receipt “Acct. Services Trial and Pardon Board. Com. v. Peyton” — was for services solely for obtaining a pardon by Christmas, it was obviously unreasonable. However, we all know that Margiotti’s death prevented his presenting his version of the agreement. Nevertheless, the jury believed plaintiffs’ witnesses; the lower Court approved the jury’s verdict; and since I find neither palpable abuse of discretion nor error of law, I would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice McBride joins in this concurring opinion.
Taking into consideration all the factors which, are or should be taken into consideration in the particular case.