concurring opinion by Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice, Roberts in which O'Brien, C.J., and Larsen, Flaherty and Hutchinson, JJ., joined
How later courts described this case
- concurring opinion by Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice, Roberts in which O'Brien, C.J., and Larsen, Flaherty and Hutchinson, JJ., joined
- “Where injunctive relief is sought, our initial focus should be on the threshold question regarding whether equity jurisdiction is appropriate. That equity will not intervene where there is available an adequate statutorily prescribed remedy at law[] is a principle well established in this Commonwealth.”
- concurring opinion of former Chief Justice Roberts
- equity will not intervene where there is available an adequate statutorily prescribed remedy at law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
The injunction must be set aside, not because the Commonwealth Court lacked jurisdiction, but because appellee has failed to demonstrate any constitutional or statutory infirmities with respect to the administrative remedies available to contest his suspension. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment only.
The opinion of Mr. Justice McDermott states the issue in this case to be “whether the court below lacked the power to grant injunctive relief.” At 514. The opinion concludes that, because the Department of Public Welfare provides a procedure through which appellee ultimately could have had his suspension lifted, his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies precluded the Commonwealth Court from entertaining challenges to the validity of those remedies.
*538 Although courts should not prematurely interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings or excuse an unjustified failure to pursue them, see Canonsburg General Hospital v. Department of Health, 492 Pa. 68 , 422 A.2d 141 (1980), the mere fact that some administrative remedy is available does not deprive a court of the power to entertain claims challenging an agency’s failure to afford a constitutionally or statutorily required remedy. The availability of the administrative remedy bears only on the appropriateness of granting the relief requested.
In his application for relief filed with the Commonwealth Court, appellee alleged that his suspension without a prior hearing denied him due process and violated statutory provisions relating to the practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies, particularly the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 504. Appellee has failed to meet his burden of establishing either allegation.
Appellee’s due process allegation is clearly foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Forbes Health System, 492 Pa. 77 , 422 A.2d 480 (1980), in which this Court held that due process does not require that physician-providers be afforded pretermination hearings. “[D]ue process [is] met by full administrative hearings accorded appellees before the Hearings and Appeals Unit of DPW.” 492 Pa. at 90, 422 A.2d at 486. Appellee’s statutory argument is equally without merit. Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law states: “No adjudication shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.” As the statutory definition of “adjudication” makes clear, see 2 Pa.C.S. § 101, section 504 does not affect the authority of an administrative agency to take preliminary action with respect to persons within the agency’s jurisdiction. Section 504 merely provides that a party subjected to such action is entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard on the permissibility of the action taken. See Callahan v. Pennsylvania State Police, 494 Pa. 461 , 431 A.2d 946 (1981).
*539 Thus, although the Commonwealth Court had jurisdiction to entertain appellee’s claim, the issuance of the injunction was improper because appellee failed to establish his entitlement to relief.
O’BRIEN, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY and HUTCHINSON, JJ., join this concurring opinion.