stating that a court with jurisdiction has the power to determine “all essential questions” and “to do any and all things with reference thereto” as authorized by the Constitution, statutes, or established principles of law
How later courts described this case
- stating that a court with jurisdiction has the power to determine “all essential questions” and “to do any and all things with reference thereto” as authorized by the Constitution, statutes, or established principles of law
- explaining that even if trial court dismissed indictments “without statutory authority,” the only manner in which the trial court might reobtain jurisdiction would be the return of new grand jury indictments
- dismissing a mandamus petition on the ground that the relief sought had become moot and noting that “there is nothing to mandamus, ergo mandamus does not lie”
- denying mandamus relief on grounds that the respondent lost jurisdiction over a case after the indictments were dismissed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Patently, the majority is incorrect in stating that:
“mandamus is appropriate if a judge acts beyond his statutory authority. White v. Reiter, 640 S.W.2d 586 (1982). * * * " 1
There is no statutory basis for a trial judge to act in many particulars generally accepted, such as granting immunity, for example; yet, I doubt any member of the Court would question the inherent power — the jurisdiction of a trial court — to do so. Being both incorrect 2 and unnecessary to the reasoning of the Court, this statement should be eliminated from the opinion.
As to the ultimate relief issued in this case, I agree that once the trial court ordered the indictment dismissed, the court simultaneously lost jurisdiction of the cause and this Court cannot breathe life back into it anymore than the trial court could by “reinstating” the expired cause.
As to the “with prejudice” part of the dismissal, I would hold the State has another remedy adequate to test its validity: The State could simply refile the cases against the defendants and litigate the appropriateness of that action at that time.
Just today in Cause No. 69,294, styled Turner v. McDonald, we hand down an opinion which rejects an argument advanced by the Respondent and observe that the fact that justiciable issues may be raised in the proceeding we order, is no reason to prevent that proceeding. (Slip op. at 7, n. 9.)
If this Court intends to get into the mandamus/prohibition business full time — (and all recent indications are that it is) — we should proceed with extraordinary caution, assuring that settled principles of extraordinary remedy law are faithfully applied and that our own opinions do not conflict, either internally or one with another.
I concur with the denial of the writ of mandamus as to reinstatement of the causes. I further concur that the State is free to refile the cases; I, however, do not agree that the State’s seeking, or this Court’s granting, a writ of mandamus to that end, is necessary. Most of all I regret the damage done to legal principles in the majority’s doing to such an end.
. All emphasis is added by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.
. As the author of White v. Reiter, supra, I can categorically deny that it can under any interpretation be read to support this statement for which the majority cites it.