announcing the rule that it is "no longer presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error."
How later courts described this case
- announcing the rule that it is "no longer presumed that simply because an error is committed it is prejudicial error."
- which authorizes prosecutors to issue subpoenas and administer oaths in all criminal matters they are investigating
- relying on the definition of interrogation from Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682
- relying on the definition of interrogation from Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I cannot agree that evidence of appellant’s guilt is overwhelming. I have serious doubts as to his guilt. There is no question but that he committed the crimes for which he was convicted. However, his mental condition at the time of the commission of the crimes and at the trial is very uncertain. It would have been relatively easy to have returned him to the state hospital or to a regional treatment facility for the purpose of examination prior to trial. It would have cost far less than allowing the deposition of the doctor in California.
Within several weeks after appellant was arrested he was arraigned. He entered a not guilty plea by reason of mental disease or defect. He was sent to the state hospital on March 30,1982, and found by the staff of the state hospital to be suffering from mental disease or defect to the degree that he was unable to assist effectively in his defense and was unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. In December, 1982, he was declared to be competent to stand trial and was released from the state hospital with a 30 day supply of medicine. He was tried the first week in May of 1983.
On March 1, 1983, the appellant sought further examination relating to his defense of mental defect. Although the trial was still two months away the court refused to have him reexamined or allow funds for an independent examination. In view of appellant’s condition shortly after the crimes I believe j ustice demanded that he be given a current examination prior to trial. I think it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to have the appellant reexamined by the state hospital or to allow an independent examination.
Also, I wish to voice my objection to the manner in which juries are selected in Crawford County. When 70-75% of a selected panel are normally excused or fail to show up for duty at trial time it leaves the impression the jury wheel is really not being utilized although it was used to draw the panel in the beginning. A defendant is entitled to know when and why panel members are excused from serving at his trial. If 75% of those selected are ineligible to serve there is something wrong with the use of the jury wheel. In the future I will vote to reverse any judgment from any county when the selection of a jury is as haphazard as is demonstrated here. Likely there was no intent to do wrong; nevertheless it leaves a bad impression.
Hollingsworth, J., joins this dissent as to the manner of jury selection.