Opinion

Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Rapistan, Inc.

  • 472 Pa. 36
  • 371 A.2d 178
  • 1976 Pa. LEXIS 794
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Oct 8, 1976
Status
Published
Author
Manderino
On the bench
Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Manderino, Nix
Cited by
28 cases

J-26 of 1975, filed October 8, 1976

How later courts described this case

  • J-26 of 1975, filed October 8, 1976

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MANDERINO, Justice

(dissenting).

I dissent. The majority opinion virtually eliminates the counterclaim provisions in the Arbitration Act. That section of the Act provides:

“The board [of arbitration] shall have power to order the interpleader or impleader of other parties whenever necessary for the complete determination of any claim or counterclaim.” (Emphasis added.)

Act of May 20, 1937, P.L. 728, No. 193, § 6, as amended, 72 P.S. § 4651-6.

The majority’s interpretation of that section is as follows: The board of arbitration may hear counterclaims *52 if the Commonwealth decides to bring them before it. This interpretation construes the language of the counterclaim provision of the Arbitration Act as permissive rather than compulsory. Under the terms of the contract, however, the Commonwealth was bound to litigate any counterclaim before the board of arbitration. The contract, therefore, provided for compulsory counterclaims, rather than permissive counterclaims.

The majority opinion is completely contrary to all of the reasons that have been advanced in support of counterclaim provisions. In the past courts have attempted to force the disposition in one action of all claims which have arisen between the parties to the litigation. This, of course, would eliminate any multiplicity of lawsuits and any possible contradiction of results. The majority, however, ignores these factors and would rather allow the Commonwealth to choose its forum since its counterclaim is larger than the claim presented by Rapistan.

It is most unfortunate that the majority is forced to reach a strained construction of a statute in order to accommodate one of the parties under a contract provision. Since we are dealing with an interpretation of the arbitration clause in the contract it would be much more reasonable to conclude that the Commonwealth is required to litigate the counterclaim against Rapistan before the board of arbitration. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court dismissing the Commonwealth’s complaint.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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