Opinion

Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc.

  • 326 Ark. 895
  • 935 S.W.2d 258
  • 935 S.W.2d 285
  • 1996 Ark. LEXIS 684
Court
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Filed
Dec 16, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Brown
On the bench
Roaf, Kinslow, Corbin, Brown, Sanders, Jesson, Glaze
Cited by
51 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.4%

stating that “[a]s a general rule, statutes have no effect except within the state’s own territorial limits,” and refusing to apply the Arkansas Unfair Practices Act, §§ 4-75-201, et seq., extraterritorially

How later courts described this case

  • stating that “[a]s a general rule, statutes have no effect except within the state’s own territorial limits,” and refusing to apply the Arkansas Unfair Practices Act, §§ 4-75-201, et seq., extraterritorially
  • recognizing that the defendant’s satisfaction of its burden may be “clear from the face of the complaint”
  • holding that the statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is five years
  • "[I]n the absence of concealment of the wrong, [a breach-of-contract action begins to accrue] when the injury occurs, not when it is discovered."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

ROBERT L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. This is a complex matter involving the Chalmers Toyota dealership in West Memphis and the parent company for Toyota as well as the regional Toyota distributors. The majority affirms summary judgment against Chal-mers, and in favor of the Toyota corporations, on the ground that Chalmers’s complaint filed on August 27, 1993, was too late and violated the three-year limitations period for torts. I disagree because I believe a fact question has been created by Toyota’s actions.

Chalmers’s contention is that Toyota has discriminated against his dealerships in West Memphis compared with the Toyota dealerships in Memphis. This discrimination took the form of price disparities for vehicles shipped into the Memphis and West Memphis markets, with higher prices for the same vehicles assessed to Chalmers’s West Memphis dealership. It also took the form of vehicles loaded with accessories being made available to Chalmers which resulted in higher prices to him as compared to his Memphis counterparts. The problem arises, according to Chalmers, because West Memphis and Memphis are in different distribution regions for Toyota: West Memphis is in Gulf States Toyota region (GST) and Memphis is in Toyota Motor Distributors region (TMD).

According to the record before us. Chalmers complained bitterly about this disparate treatment but, according to Chalmers, GST gave him assurances that the matter would be rectified. In 1990 and 1991 those efforts to cure the situation centered around Chalmers being placed in the TMD region with the Memphis dealerships. That would have eliminated the disparity in treatment between the dealerships in West Memphis and Memphis. According to Chalmers, GST was amenable to the idea and misled him into believing that this solution was viable.

The chronology on this point is important:

October 4, 1989:

Chalmers wrote the parent company, Toyota Motor Sales, that the price of cars to him was more than the Memphis dealerships. He said he did not know how long the price discrimination had existed but that it should be investigated.

October 16, 1989:

Toyota Motor Sales wrote Chalmers that there were no discriminatory pricing practices and that the Gulf States Toyota president would work with him to create a situation where its dealers were competitive.

December 1, 1989:

Chalmers wrote Toyota Motor Sales and contested the division of one metropolitan area (Memphis and West Memphis) into two operating distributorships with separate pricing policies.

January 22, 1990:

Chalmers met with Gulf States Toyota representatives to discuss, among other things, his joining the TMD region with the Memphis dealerships. GST, according to Chalmers, committed to solving his problem.

March 12, 1990:

Chalmers wrote to Gulf States Toyota that his sales deficiencies were due to the discriminatory pricing between the West Memphis and Memphis markets.

July 1, 1992:

Chalmers wrote Jerry Pyle, Gulf States Toyota’s president, that GST had disregarded its commitment to rectify his situation. One solution had been his transfer into the same distribution region as Memphis. He wrote that though GST had committed to correcting his problem in January 1990, when he contacted Toyota Motor Sales in December 1990, the company was unaware of this commitment.

July 15, 1992:

Jerry Pyle, president of Gulf States Toyota, wrote Chal-mers that Gulf States Toyota was not discriminating with its pricing and that a market study had been conducted of the West Memphis market which “irrefutably demonstrated” that West Memphis should not be part of the Memphis distribution area. Pyle wrote: “TMS and GST consider this issue closed ...”

Pyle added that GST stood ready to assist him in his sales performance but then stated: “If, for any reason, you choose not to work toward the solution that I have suggested, there are other forums (both administrative and legal) where you can properly address your grievances.”

Chalmers’s argument contemplates that Toyota cajoled, manipulated, and ultimately misled him into believing the situation would be cured by placing him in the TMD region with the Memphis dealerships. This occurred until July 15, 1992. That constitutes enough positive action in my judgment under First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313 , 843 S.W.2d 842 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993), to raise a fact question concerning a concealment of Toyota’s true intentions. Certainly, Chalmers relied on Toyota’s promise to study his unique marketing region. A market study was done, but Chalmers was not told that the issue was closed until Jerry Pyle’s letter in 1992. With that letter, negotiations broke down, and Toyota referred Chalmers to the courts.

We are not required at this juncture to determine whether substantial evidence supports Chalmers’s claim of concealment but only to decide whether a material issue of fact exists. Ark. R. Civ. P. 56. I conclude that one does. I would remand this matter so that Chalmers can further develop his case.

Corbin, J., joins. SANDERS, B.W., Special Associate Justice, joins.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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