Commonwealth v. Lewis

*58 SPAETH, Judge,

dissenting:

I disagree with the majority’s assumption that Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214 , 364 A.2d 1345 (1976), is to be applied prospectively only. I would remand for further proceedings below.

It is in general incorrect and misleading to apply the terms “retrospective” and “prospective” to a court’s interpretation of a statute.

Unless vested rights are affected, a court’s interpretation of a statute is considered to have been the law from its enactment date, despite contrary intervening holdings. Buradus v. General Cement Prods. Co., 159 Pa.Super. 501 , 48 A.2d 883 (1946), aff’d 356 Pa. 349 , 52 A.2d 205 (1947). In such circumstances, the latest interpretation is applicable to a case whose appeal has not yet been decided. Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620, 625 , 222 A.2d 897, 900 (1966) (footnote omitted).

It does not matter that the present case involves a rule and not a statute, for it is clearly implied in Pa.Const. art. 5, § 10(c), that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court are of equal rank with statutes. 1

*59 It is true that certain language in Mayfield has a prospective ring:

Henceforth, the trial court may grant an extension under Rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the “due diligence” of the prosecution, and (2) certification that trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business; provided that if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the causes of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.

469 Pa. 214, 222 , 364 A.2d 1345, 1349-50 (emphasis added). Unlike the majority, however, I read this as a directive to the trial bench only, and believe that on review of cases pending when Mayfield was decided, we are obliged to search the record to determine whether the requirements of Mayfield were satisfied, viz., that “the record must . show the causes of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.”

In a case like the present it is almost inevitable that the record will not show the causes of the court delay and the *60 reasons why the delay could not be avoided, since before the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayfield a lower court could not have known the Mayfield requirements. Given such an insufficient record, it would be unfair to the Commonwealth automatically to discharge an appellant. However, it does not follow, as the majority seems to assume, that automatic affirmance of a grant of extension is the only or fair alternative, for that would deny an appellant the speedy-trial guarantee of Rule 1100 as it has now been explicated in Mayfield .

The proper remedy, in my opinion, is to remand to the lower court so that it may satisfy the requirements of Mayfield . In the present case it might be said that the requirement of “certification that trial [was] scheduled for the earliest possible date consistent with the court’s business” was satisfied by evidence of the terms of the grand juries in Cumberland County and the scheduling of court sessions. It might also be said that this evidence satisfied the requirement to “show the causes of the court delay.” However, there is nothing in the record that satisfies the requirement to show “the reasons why the delay [could] not be avoided.”

Given that Rule 1100 is in part intended to encourage — in fact, to impel — courts to effect such changes in their procedures as will help ensure speedy trials, see Mayfield, supra 469 Pa. at 220 , 364 A.2d at 1348 , I think we must require more of a lower court than what we have here — the mere statement that it sits only four times a year. It must tell us why it does this, and why, if this schedule causes a delay such as the one in the present case, the court’s procedures cannot be changed so that such delays are avoided. The majority may be right that “[i]n many of the smaller counties . . . criminal sessions held four times a year are more than adequate to keep the court’s business current.” Majority Opinion 247 Pa.Super. at 54, 371 A.2d at 1322. Under Mayfield , however, it is not for us to make such a finding, or assumption, of fact; rather, it is the lower court’s responsibility to show on the record that its business *61 does not require a change in its procedures. 2 Here, because no remand has been ordered, the lower court has been relieved of that responsibility, with the result that appellant may have been denied his right to a speedy trial.

Accordingly, I dissent.

. It might be argued that my application of this principle of construction to a Supreme Court case construing a Rule of Criminal Procedure is contradicted by Commonwealth v. Lockhart, 227 Pa.Super. 503 , 322 A.2d 707 (1974), and Commonwealth v. Schork, 230 Pa.Super. 411 , 326 A.2d 878 (1974). In Lockhart we held that we would apply prospectively only the rule of Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368 , 312 A.2d 597 (1973) (additional, on-the-record questions required in colloquy under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101); in Schork we reached the same conclusion as to the application of the rule of Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198 , 316 A.2d 77 (1974) (requirements for valid colloquies under Pa.R.Crim.P. 319(a)). There are, however, important differences between the situations in those cases and that of the present case.

First, the requirements of Williams and Ingram were additional protections grafted onto protections already provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. For that reason defendants who were not afforded the additional protections, due to our giving prospective effect only to the new requirements, were not left without recourse. Either on appeal, Commonwealth v. Schork, supra, 230 Pa.Super. at 415-17 , 326 A.2d at 879 -881 or in PCHA proceedings, Commonwealth v. Williams, 232 Pa.Super. 339, 342 , 331 A.2d 875, 878 (1974), a defendant could show that his waiver of jury trial, in a Williams case, or his *59 guilty plea, in an Ingram case, was not knowing and intelligent. In contrast, an appellant whose trial record does not show the things required by Mayfield has no alternative way to demonstrate to us that he was denied his Rule 1100 right to speedy trial, for the proof is in the control of the lower court. Nor will such an appellant have further opportunity to argue the point for after appeal his Rule 1100 claim will have been “finally litigated,” 19 P.S. § 1180-4(a), and therefore not cognizable in post-conviction proceedings, 19 P.S. § 1180-3(d).

Second, an important factor — perhaps the important factor — in our decisions in Lockhart and Schork was the “havoc in the administration of justice” that would result from retrospective application of the Williams and Ingram rules. See Lockhart, supra, 227 Pa.Super. at 507-08 , 322 A.2d at 709 ; Schork, supra, 230 Pa.Super. at 414-15 , 326 A.2d at 879-880 . No such havoc would be threatened by application of the Mayfield requirements to cases still pending on appeal, for the procedural remedy (as I suggest below) would be to remand for compliance with Mayfield . Following remand, we would be able to determine whether the judicial delay did or did not justify an extension. If it did, we would affirm the Rule 1100 ruling; if it did not, we would order appellant discharged. Thus there is no danger that “countless cases would have to be retried.” Cf. Lockhart, supra, 227 Pa. Super, at 507, 322 A.2d at 709 .

. The majority seems to conclude that the burden is on an appellant to persuade us that a lower court must change its procedures: “Additional court sessions should not be required unless there is a clear showing that the business of the court requires such a procedure.” Majority Opinion 247 Pa.Super. at 54, 371 A.2d at 1322. This conclusion is contrary to Mayfield and to the intent of Rule 1100.