concluding that the victim impact evidence was prejudicial because "there is a reasonable probability that but for the admission of the ... evidence that addressed [the defendant's] character and the victims' opinions of the appropriate sentence, [the defendant] would have received a more favorable sentence"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the victim impact evidence was prejudicial because "there is a reasonable probability that but for the admission of the ... evidence that addressed [the defendant's] character and the victims' opinions of the appropriate sentence, [the defendant] would have received a more favorable sentence"
- finding the victim impact evidence prejudicial because it "was angry in tone, inflammatory in content and contained messages that [the defendant] was beyond rehabilitation .... and comprised a large portion of the total evidence presented"
- stating that, “[b]y entering an Alford plea, a defendant does not admit guilt” but instead “enters a guilty plea because he recognizes that a prosecutor has enough evidence to obtain a guilty verdict”
- observing that "whenever there is a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected result does not constitute ineffectiveness of counsel" (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DURHAM, Chief Justice,
concurring:
151 I concur fully in the analysis and result of the majority opinion on the federal issue, but write separately to note my concern at the failure to engage first with the state law questions properly preserved and briefed. Structurally, I believe this court should determine first whether state law has been complied with before addressing claims that the federal Constitution has been violated. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1005-06 (Utah 1994) (adopting the primacy approach wherein the court "looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when state law is not dispositive," and thus provides for a "consistent method" that accords "with the original purpose of the federal system" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 88 , 1 52, 199 P.3d 985 (Durham, C.J., concurring) ("The failure to undertake independent state analysis in cases where state law is argued contributes to a paucity of precedent and the absence of an independent and adequate state ground for our holding."); State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, 133 , 162 P.3d 1106 ("[Ilt is part of the inherent logic of federalism that state law be interpreted independently and prior to consideration of federal questions."); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) ("[When a party asserts claims under both the Utah and federal Constitutions, this court ordinarily first determines the issue under the Utah Constitution and only resorts to the federal Constitution if the state constitution is not dispositive.").
1 52 Justice PARRISH concurs in Chief Justice DURHAM's concurring opinion.