explaining that at suppression hearing, “the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony” because “the trial court, who observes the demeanor and appearance of the witnesses, is in a better position to determine their credibility than the appellate court is by reading their testimony as it appears in the record”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that at suppression hearing, “the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony” because “the trial court, who observes the demeanor and appearance of the witnesses, is in a better position to determine their credibility than the appellate court is by reading their testimony as it appears in the record”
- concluding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy at residence where he did not live because there was “no evidence that appellant had a property or possessory interest in, or unrestricted access to, the [] residence” or that defendant “had dominion or control over the residence, or the right to exclude others”
- stating that the purpose of both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution is to safeguard an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions
- holding that the appellant failed to prove standing to challenge search of residence where there was no evidence that he had a property or possessory interest, unrestricted access, dominion or control, or the right to exclude others
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OVERSTREET, J.,
dissenting.
We granted appellant’s first ground for review which avers, “The court of appeals erred in holding that [he] did not have standing to contest an illegal intrusion and search of a residence in which he was an invited guest.” The basis of appellant’s ground arises from the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision concluding that-appellant did not have standing to raise the constitutional claim because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. Villarreal v. State, 893 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.App.Houston [1st] 1994, pet. granted).
The majority agrees with the court of appeals’ rationale that the evidence did not establish that appellant’s expectation of privacy was one that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable under the circumstances; thus the majority concludes that appellant did not have standing to challenge the search and seizure. I feel that society does indeed recognize one’s expectation of privacy in the sanctity of the home. This Court should recognize that all persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are lawfully visiting or temporarily residing at another’s residence no matter what the length of the stay. Such would seem to be a fundamental principal of a free society, a society that contemplates freedom of movement and respects the rights of the people to visit others and be free from unreasonable searches and seizures while so visiting.
As the majority acknowledges, the United States Supreme Court has held that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy and has standing to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). An overnight guest’s expectation of privacy is rooted in understandings that are permitted by society. Id. The Supreme Court also pointed out that if such were not true, an adult child temporarily staying with parents would have no reasonable expectation of privacy because the child’s right to admit or exclude would be subject to the parents’ veto. Id. Such is obviously untenable in a free society; and it is likewise untenable for the same adult child to be visiting parents for an evening but to have no expectation of privacy (and no Fourth Amendment protections) simply because the visit is not intended to be overnight. Such is the effect of the majority’s holding — nonovernight invited guests, e.g. parents, children, friends, anyone, have no reasonable expectation of privacy. I cannot agree with such a holding. There is not a moratorium on constitutional search and seizure protections when one enters another’s residence as an invited non-overnight guest. When invited into someone else’s home, a guest’s constitutional rights are not left outside at the door simply because the guest is not spending the night there.
The constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply to invited non-overnight guests of residences because such guests do have a legitimate expectation of privacy; therefore appellant had standing to complain about the search in this case. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand to that court to address the merits of appellant’s search and seizure claim. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
BAIRD, J., joins.