The opinion
KEITH, Justice,
concurring.
It is with some reluctance that I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s judgment because of the claimed erroneous admission of opinion testimony. We have reviewed a tremendous record and two isolated instances now combine to bring about a reversal of an otherwise errorless judgment.
All litigants should keep in mind the admonition to be found in The Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex.1968):
“The burden is upon a party appealing from a trial court judgment to show that the judgment is erroneous in order to obtain a reversal.”
This burden includes the rule articulated by Chief Justice Wheeler more than a century ago in Hill v. Baylor, 23 Tex. 261, 263 (1859), which still prevails:
“It is scarcely necessary to say, that objections to the admissibility of evidence not taken below, and which, if taken, might have been obviated at the trial, cannot be first urged in this court, as a ground for reversing the judgment.”
*109 Although my uneasiness is applicable to both instances discussed by our Chief Justice, in the interest of time and space, I will confine my specific remarks to the Purcell incident. His testimony was offered in the form of an oral deposition taken by agreement wherein objections had been reserved until time of trial. Plaintiffs’ motion in limine to prevent defendants’ counsel from asking Purcell his opinion as to the cause of the accident had been presented and granted.
There was considerable discussion between the court and trial counsel without any definitive ruling on the question then before the court. Finally, on page 1295-A, being the concluding page of Volume 5 of the Statement of Facts, the court reporter inserted this note:
“(NOTE BY COURT REPORTER: At this point there was a hearing held out of the presence of the jury, such hearing being Pages 1296 through 1389 inclusive; this testimony was not admitted for the jury’s consideration and upon the instruction of counsel for plaintiffs, same is being deleted from the Statement of Facts.)”
Volume 6 of the Statement of Facts starts upon the next day with page 1390. Thus, with nearly a hundred pages of the record deliberately omitted, it is extremely difficult to follow the plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting Purcell’s testimony.
The contention is expressed in this manner:
“Perhaps the most prejudicial portion of the police officer’s testimony, admitted over the plaintiffs’ objection (S.F. 1409-1411), was the following:
“ ‘Q Did you conclude that any traffic law had been violated at the time this collision occurred?
“ ‘A Yes, sir, it appeared that the Dat-sun pickup [driven by the deceased] had not stayed in his lane of traffic.’ (S.F. 1464).” 1
The key and operative words found in the argument are these: “admitted over the plaintiffs’ objection.” I have read and reread the portion of the Statement of Facts wherein the objection is said to be found and do not find a tenable objection. One thing is certain, there are no objections to be found on page 1464 of the Statement of Facts — the time when the jury heard the evidence, and the single place mentioned in the plaintiffs’ brief.
To illustrate the problem, I quote from the colloquy between the court and counsel when the deposition was being considered, line by line, in the absence of the jury, page 1409 found in Volume 5 of the Statement of Facts:
“THE COURT: . . . Let’s see, go to page thirty-four.
“MR. SMITH [Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Line four,
‘Q. Did you conclude any traffic law had been violated at the time this collision occurred?
‘A. Yes, sir, it appeared that the Dat-sun truck had not stayed in his lane of traffic.’ ”
[Here followed a full page (p. 1410) of comment by the Court and counsel but no objection from plaintiffs’ counsel.] 2
As the trial judge and counsel were jointly engaged in going through the deposition of Purcell in the absence of the jury, constant mention was made of testimony appearing on page number (for instance) thirty, line seven; but we do not have a deposition in our record. While the participants in this exercise in judicial wheel-spinning may have known precisely what was happening, they did not make an intelligible record sufficiently explicit to enable this court to review the action forming the basis of the present complaints.
*110 After a careful review of the record surrounding the admission of the Purcell testimony, I am unable to locate a single specific objection to such challenged testimony.
Counsel engaged in the trial of a cause should ever be acutely aware of his duty and obligation, not only to his client but to the trial court, of making prompt, specific, and detailed objections to evidence which he considers to be inadmissible. Once such an objection is made, the trial court has a reciprocal duty of making a ruling thereon so that the accuracy of the ruling may be tested upon appeal.
Dean McCormick has an excellent treatment of the need for timely and specific objections and it is recommended to trial counsel. See 1 C. McCormick & R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence §§ 22-27, at 20-26 (2d Ed. 1956). See also Brown & Root v. Haddad, 142 Tex. 624 , 180 S.W.2d 339 (1944), and Justice Pope’s recent article “Presenting and Excluding Evidence”, IX Tex.Tech L.Rev. 403, 443 (1978).
This language, extracted from Harlow v. Swift and Company, 491 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.), is applicable here:
“Plaintiff did not object to the evidence before the jury, move for a mistrial, request the court to instruct the jury not to consider the evidence, or file a motion to strike the statement from the record. Assuming the statement was inadmissible, plaintiff waived his right to complaint.” (citations omitted)
Not many cases are reversed these days because of the erroneous admission of evidence; consequently, it becomes increasingly important for trial counsel to realize the necessity of making the appropriate objection to the receipt of the evidence and presenting it to the appellate court in such form that it can be ruled upon without an unduly lengthy search of the record.
In this instance, I concur in the reversal of the judgment.
. The next reference to this testimony is to be found in plaintiffs’ motion for new trial.
. If it be argued that trial counsel and the judge had in mind plaintiffs’ objections as set out in the motion in limine, such fact did not obviate the necessity of specific objections being urged at the time the evidence was offered. K-Mart No. 4195 v. Judge, 515 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Civ.App. — Beaumont 1974, writ dism’d).