holding, in context of ineffective assistance claim, that “Lockett did not hold that plea offers are admissible as mitigating circumstances”
How later courts described this case
- holding, in context of ineffective assistance claim, that “Lockett did not hold that plea offers are admissible as mitigating circumstances”
- rejecting a postconviction allegation that the prosecutor had knowingly introduced false testimony during the trial, because the petitioner could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal and was precluded from raising the issue for the first time in a Rule 37.1 petition
- holding that claim of prosecutorial misconduct was an issue that could have been raised at trial and was therefore not cognizable in proceedings under Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1
- holding, in context of ineffective assistance claim, that “Lockett did not hold *422 that plea offers are admissible as mitigating circumstances”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
A Watson Bell, Special Justice, dissenting. I join in Chief .Justice Hannah’s dissent. I also write separately to express my concern that justice has not been served in this case. I recognize that cumulative error is not recognized by this court with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Weatherford v. State, 363 Ark. 579 , 215 S.W.3d 642 (2005). However, the error that is apparent in this case reaches far beyond error committed by counsel. The words of this court in Childress v. State, 322 Ark. 127, 140-41 , 907 S.W.2d 718, 726 (1997), are instructive:
We have stated that we will “entertain an argument of cumulative error in rare and egregious cases.” Vick v. State, 314 Ark. 618, 627 , 863 S.W.2d 820 (1993). We have reversed only when the cumulative effect of the errors committed denied the defendant a fair trial. See Dillon v. State, 311 Ark. 529 , 844 S.W.2d 944 (1993) (finding that net effect of “overly zealous” comments by prosecutor, unsupported by evidence, combined to taint jury’s decision); Alexander v. Chapman, 289 Ark. 238 , 711 S.W.2d 765 (1986) (reversing when there were twenty-eight objections by appellant to leading questions, appellee was repeatedly admonished by trial judge and objections sustained but appellee’s conduct not stopped); Harris v. State, 264 Ark. 391 , 572 S.W.2d 389 (1978) (reversing when cumulative errors, omissions, and deficiencies in warrant were sufficient to undermine court’s confidence in it).
We have before us a case where a combination of errors by the court, by counsel, and by the State have deprived Howard of a fair trial. While it might be most efficient to deal with some of the errors raised in the Rule 37 petition on direct appeal, it is only now that the case may be analyzed fully in light of all the error and only now that the full extent of the injury caused by the accumulated error is clearly manifest. “A petitioner may qualify for relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, regardless of trial counsel’s performance, if he demonstrates error so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack.” Pardue v. State, 363 Ark. 567, 570 , 215 S.W.3d 650, 654 (2005)(per curiam). Certainly, this is such a case.
Further, the death penalty has been imposed. This court has stated that, “[t]here is no question but that the death penalty is a unique punishment that demands unique attention to procedural safeguards.” Robbins v. State, 353 Ark. 556, 561 , 114 S.W.3d 217, 220 (2003). Those procedural safeguards mandate a new trial. Simple concepts of justice that date from the common law dictate that a new trial be granted. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Hannah, C.J., joins this dissent.