determining that legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine where it was “in operation and effect, a legislative command to the courts to open a judgment previously made final, and to substitute for that judgment a disposition of the matter in accordance with the subsequently expressed legislative will.”
How later courts described this case
- determining that legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine where it was “in operation and effect, a legislative command to the courts to open a judgment previously made final, and to substitute for that judgment a disposition of the matter in accordance with the subsequently expressed legislative will.”
- holding that a statute reducing sentences for marijuana possession “operated as a legislative impairment of existing final legal judgments,” while also noting “there is no power of pardon or commutation in the legislature and... the power is specifically and singularly granted to the executive branch”
- holding that “even though the legislature possesses the power to promulgate the substantive law, judicial judgments and decrees entered pursuant to those laws may not be affected by subsequent legislative changes after those judgments and decrees have become final”
- stating that, in Pennsylvania's tripartite government of equal, separate and autonomous branches, each branch acts as a check on the other, and the domain of the judiciary is to interpret, construe and apply the law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority misconceives the nature of the separation of governmental powers, I dissent. Article 2, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states,
“[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”
*290 The “legislative power” has been interpreted to be the power to make, alter, and repeal laws. In re: Marshall, 363 Pa. 326 , 69 A.2d 619 (1950). See also, Petition of City of Pittsburgh, 376 Pa. 447 , 103 A.2d 721 (1954). Traditionally, legislative enactments are general in character. See, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 , 29 S.Ct. 67 , 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908). This power to make, alter, and repeal laws is derived from the people. Except where limitations have been imposed by the state or federal constitutions, or by valid treaties and statutes, the power of the legislature is unlimited. See generally 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law §§ 227-234; and McGinley v. Scott, 401 Pa. 310 , 164 A.2d 424 (1960). Among the powers granted to the legislature by the people at the time of the creation of our constitutional form of government, was the power to pardon those convicted of crimes. U. S. v. Hughes, 175 F. 238 (D.C.1892). In fact, the legislative pardoning power was recognized in United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 163 , 8 L.Ed. 640, 644 (1833), as being superior to the pardoning power of the executive because,
“ . . . [a legislative pardon] is considered as a public law; having the same effect on the case as if the general law punishing the offense had been repealed or annulled.”
The executive power is more limited, being the power only to execute the laws as they have been enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the courts. Except where limited by the constitution, the ■ legislature may stipulate what actions the executive branch shall or shall not perform. The executive branch, although co-equal to, and independent from, the legislature, exercises this limited power because of the nature of the Constitution itself. The authority of the legislature is unlimited so long as the exercise of that authority does not violate any constitutional limitations. Commonwealth v. Wormser, 260 Pa. 44 , 103 A. 500 (1917); Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). The authority of the executive, on the other hand, extends only so far as is expressly provided in the Constitution. One of the powers expressly granted to the executive is the pardoning power. Pa.Const. Art. 4, Section 9.
*291 The judicial power is one of interpreting, applying, and enforcing existing laws as they relate to past transactions or to conditions existing at the time of the exercise of the judicial power. Once the court is created, its power derives from the Constitution, not from the statute creating it.
The judicial power of the Pennsylvania Courts is derived from Article 5 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania which vests the judicial power in a unified court system. Like the executive branch, the power of the judicial branch is limited in extent to that expressly provided for by law. Const. Art. 5, §§ 2-8. Among the judicial powers so provided by law is the power to sentence those judged guilty of crime.
As was stated in United States v. Hughes, supra, at 242: “[f]rom the very nature of government, it required no reasoning to prove the self-evident proposition that in Pennsylvania the power of pardon was vested in the legislative branch by the inherent power of the supreme law making power and in the executive by constitutional provision. The grant of this power to the executive was no limitation on the right of the power granting it to exercise it also.”
The legislative pardoning power has been said to be “precisely that which would have been afforded to the criminal if the Governor of the State issued free and unconditional pardon.” Perkins v. United States ex rel. Malesevic, 99 F.2d 255, 258 (3d Cir. 1938), citing Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316 , 32 A. 424 (1895). See also, former Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 382, § 181 (19 P.S. 893) (repealed in part by 18 P.S. 5201).
Having the authority to pardon absolutely, it follows that the legislature could devise a system to partially pardon those convicted of possession of certain controlled substances. This was done by the resentencing provision of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.
Clearly, the exercise of the authority to pardon those convicted and sentenced by the courts, whether done by the executive or by the legislative branch, affects a “final judg *292 ment” of the judiciary. A “final judgment” in a criminal case, however, has never been held to be free from the power of pardon. None of the cases relied on by the majority for the proposition that the legislature may not interfere with judicial judgment of sentence stands for that proposition. The cases cited by the majority fall into two classes: the cases cited either, (1) upheld legislative attempts to affect judicial decisions, and thus the passages quoted from them by the majority are merely dicta, or (2) the cases cited deal with legislative attempts to interfere with judicial judgments in civil cases, and, as becomes clear when these cases are analyzed, they are either inapposite or involved legislative attempts to deprive litigants of property in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law, or they violated the constitutional prohibition against amending a statute by reference to its title only. The case before us involves neither of these constitutional provisions.
Into the first group of cases fall Comm. ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 345 Pa. 581 , 28 A.2d 897 (1942), (upholding the legislative creation of a board of parole, and allowing the Act’s provisions to be. applied to cases where sentence was imposed before its effective date); Comm. ex rel. Johnson v. Halloway, 42 Pa. 446 (1862), (where the court decided on non-constitutional grounds that the challenged statute granted the “inspectors of the Penitentiary” a measure of discretion as to whether a prisoner was entitled to discharge under the Act, and that the inspectors had not abused .that discretion, thereby upholding the statute); and Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52 , 66 A.2d 577 (1949), (holding that a statute regulating the method of determining the number and fixing the salaries of court employees is not unconstitutional because of legislative encroachment on the judiciary so long as the legislature does not arbitrarily and capriciously fail to provide a sufficient number of court employees or for the payment of adequate salaries).
Into the second group fall Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 (1849); In re East Grant Street, 121 Pa. 596 , 16 A. 366 *293 (1888); Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., 122 Pa. 627 , 15 A. 917 (1888); De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18 (1850); Appeal of Edwards, 108 Pa. 283 (1885); and Pennsylvania Company, etc. v. Scott, 346 Pa. 13 , 29 A.2d 328 (1942).
Greenough v. Greenough, supra, involved a disputed claim under a will. The court held that the challenged legislative enactment could not be applied retroactively because to do so would violate a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except by judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Greenough thus stands for the proposition that the legislative attempt to overrule a judicial decision was invalid because it violated a specific constitutional prohibition, not because of any legislative encroachment on the judicial power.
De Chastellux v. Fairchild, supra, held that the legislature could not direct the grant of a new trial in a trespass action because to do so deprived the plaintiff “ . . . of a judgment, which is essentially his property . . . .” Thus De Chastellux, like Greenough , prohibits the legislative taking of property without due process of law because it violates a specific constitutional prohibition.
Pennsylvania Company v. Scott, supra, also held that the legislature could not affect previously rendered judgments because a judgment is “property” of which the judgment creditor cannot be deprived without due process of law under the state and federal constitutions.
In In re East Grant Street, supra the court stated that the Act of June 8, 1881 “ . . . professes to declare the meaning of the said section of the act of 1874, and if this were all, the act of 1881 would conflict with Section 6 of Article 3 of the Constitution which declares that ‘no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted, and published at length.’ ” The court continued, however, and pointed out that the Act of 1881 went *294 further and validly amended the Act of 1874. East Grant Street thus stands simply for the proposition that a legislative attempt to change a pre-existing law by reference to its title only, is violative of Article 3, § 6, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that to amend a pre-existing statute, the legislative must re-enact and publish “at length.”
Titusville Iron Works v. Keystone Oil Co., supra, held only that the Act of June 17, 1887, violated Article 3, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution in providing that two other acts (mentioned only by title and date) should be construed in a certain way. Like, East Grant Street, Titusville Oil held only that the legislature violates a specific constitutional prohibition when it attempts to amend a pre-existing statute by reference only to its title.
Appeal of Edwards, supra, held that the legislature could not alter the fact of illegitimate birth so as to entitle such a child to take by purchase under a limitation in a prior deed of trust to “lawfully begotten children.” The court said that the legislature did have the power to confer legitimacy upon an illegitimate child so as to render him capable of inheriting from an ancester to the same extent as if he had been born in wedlock. That legislatively conferred legitimacy, however, did not make him “lawfully begotten” so as to come within the condition -in the trust. Edwards in no way stands for the proposition urged by the majority.
Clearly therefore, none of the cases relied on by the majority opinion support the proposition that the resentencing provision of the revised Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act encroaches upon the exclusive province of the judiciary. The resentencing provision does not encroach on exclusively judicial powers and should be upheld.