finding complicity instruction proper where some evidence pointed to complicity and noting that the jury was not required to believe co-defendant’s testimony that the appellant acted on his own
How later courts described this case
- finding complicity instruction proper where some evidence pointed to complicity and noting that the jury was not required to believe co-defendant’s testimony that the appellant acted on his own
- explaining that “the jury was not required to believe” testimony indicating the defendant acted alone when other evidence implied the defendant acted together with his wife
- "Mrs. Pate testified that Appellant actually lived in the apartment and his clothing and legal documents (e.g., social security card) were located in the apartment. When he was arrested, Appellant told police that the equipment they were seizing was his and that they were seizing it illegally. In light of this evidence, we reject Appellant’s argument that he did not possess, constructively or otherwise, the equipment found in the apartment.”
- ‘Whether consent is the result of express or implied coercion is a question of fact . . . and thus, we must defer to the trial court’s finding if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (quotation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concurring Opinion by
Justice CUNNINGHAM.
I concur in the result but disagree with the majority’s analysis of the validity of Mrs. Pate’s consent. An inquiry into the issue of consent is unnecessary because here, unlike in Bumper v. North Carolina, Sergeant Lily possessed a valid arrest warrant at the time he entered the Pate home. “[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1388 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). A “reasonable belief is established by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances.” United *336 States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.2006). Common sense alone provides an officer a sufficient basis to believe that a suspect might be present in his own residence. Furthermore, when Mrs. Pate made the bare assertion that Appellant was not home, Officer Lilly expressed his desire to check the apartment “himself’, thus evidencing his belief that Appellant might be present. Absent some indication on the record that Officer Lilly had reason to believe that Appellant was not present, other than Mrs. Pate’s assertion, the arrest warrant provided sufficient authority to enter the home. Moreover, the scope of Officer Lilly’s search did not exceed that permitted to effectuate an in-home arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).