finding no grounds for recusal on the basis of Judge Cherry's involvement with the Prison Board where "[t]he record reveals that Judge Cherry was, in fact, fair and impartial, and indeed, that he demonstrated a great deal of patience when interacting with the pro se appellant"
How later courts described this case
- finding no grounds for recusal on the basis of Judge Cherry's involvement with the Prison Board where "[t]he record reveals that Judge Cherry was, in fact, fair and impartial, and indeed, that he demonstrated a great deal of patience when interacting with the pro se appellant"
- holding that the trial court did not err in quashing a subpoena duces tecum, where an appellant sought the personnel files of two investigating officers, but could offer no reasonable basis for his request
- observing that evidence of intoxication may only be offered to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree pursuant to Section 308 of the Crimes Code if it shows that the defendant was overwhelmed to the point of losing her faculties and sensibilities
- stating that “[a] verdict is against the weight of evidence only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join Parts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the majority opinion. With regard to Appellant’s claim that the common pleas court erred by denying funds to retain expert psychiatric assistance (Part IV), I would remand for a fuller explanation concerning the reasons supporting the denial, but for Appellant’s indication at the sentencing hearing that he did not wish to pursue the matter further. In my view, the circumstances of Appellant’s offenses themselves implicate the possibility that mental and/or emotional issues may have been relevant to sentencing. The trial court’s explanation for the denial of funding, however, as set forth in its Rule 1925 opinion, goes only to the issue of constitutional entitlement to funds, not to the discretionary *540 authority to allocate them. 1 Further, in terms of reasoning, the motions judge’s order suggests at most a concern pertaining to the appropriate source of funding, as between the court’s budget and that of the public defender. Since I do not believe that decisions concerning funding for the development of defenses to the imposition of the death penalty should turn on budgetary disputes, some further explanation would be beneficial.
Nevertheless, at trial, Appellant’s standby counsel attempted to put the funding issue before the trial judge at the outset of the penalty hearing, when the court could have taken measures to address it if warranted, such as by allocating funds and granting a continuance to secure an examination. 2 Representing himself, however, Appellant stated that he wished to withdraw the motion and asked the trial court to move on. In these circumstances, I agree with the Commonwealth’s position that the claim, at this juncture, is appropriately treated as unpreserved for our review.
Justice BAER joins this concurring opinion.
. I have previously expressed difficulty with the reasoning supporting the prevailing constitutional interpretation of this Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 560 Pa. 500, 524-25 , 746 A.2d 592, 605 (2000) (Saylor, J., concurring). While I recognize that I am bound by the precedent concerning the constitutional dynamic, I do not read the constitutional decisions as foreclosing all review of the discretionary aspect of funding decisions pertaining to indigent capital defendants.
. Although the motions judge’s position may have remained controlling, the trial judge had the benefit of observing Appellant's behavior throughout trial, and therefore, it is possible that a different decision might have been appropriate, in light of new circumstances. In my view, the salient fact is that the trial judge was never required to make this decision, on account of Appellant’s decision to forego the issue.