holding that “[r]egulations adopted by an agency pursuant to a legislative mandate are presumed to be valid” and according “defer[rence] to an agency’s interpretation of a statute” unless that interpretation “is plainly unreasonable[,] . . . is contrary to the statutory language, or . . . undermines the Legislature’s intent” in a case involving regulations and an adjudication by New Jersey’s Commissioner of Banking and Insurance (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[r]egulations adopted by an agency pursuant to a legislative mandate are presumed to be valid” and according “defer[rence] to an agency’s interpretation of a statute” unless that interpretation “is plainly unreasonable[,] . . . is contrary to the statutory language, or . . . undermines the Legislature’s intent” in a case involving regulations and an adjudication by New Jersey’s Commissioner of Banking and Insurance (internal quotation marks omitted)
- finding courts do not defer to an agency's interpretation of a regulation if the interpretation is "pla inly unreasonable" or "contrary to the [regulatory] language" (quoting In re N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Council 73, 150 N.J. 331, 351 (1997))
- noting that when “regulation is ‘plainly at odds with the statute, we must set it aside.’ ” (citation omitted)
- stating the general proposition that an entity cannot exceed the scope of its statutory authority, and is therefore, restricted from overstepping the limitations imposed on it by the State
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*496 Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
As defined by the majority, this case involves a simple issue: “whether, and under what circumstances, a driver who is involved in a single-vehicle accident may be considered to be ‘at-fault’ for purposes of assessing insurance eligibility rating points.” Ante at 487, 946 A.2d at 567. Because, after full briefing and argument, that issue does not strike me as worthy of consideration on a petition for certification, and because I am of the view that the analysis, reasoning, and conclusions reached by the Appellate Division were correct, I respectfully dissent.
Certification should be granted only in limited instances. Rule 2:12-4 lays out clearly the high hurdle a petition for certification must vault in order to justify Supreme Court review:
Certification will be granted only if the appeal presents a question of general public importance which has not been but should be settled by the Supreme Court or is similar to a question presented on another appeal to the Supreme Court; if the decision under review is in conflict with any other decision of the same or a higher court or calls for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervision and in other matters if the interest of justice requires. Certification will not be allowed on final judgments of the Appellate Division except for special reasons.
[ (Emphasis supplied).]
This appeal presents unique and idiosyncratic events arising out of a weather-related, single-automobile accident. Full consideration of this appeal discloses, however, that it does not present “a question of general public importance[;]” it does not present a “conflict with any other decision of the same or a higher court[;]” it does not present an instance that “calls for an exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervision[;]” it does not present a case that should be reviewed because “the interest of justice requires[;]” and it does not present any “special reasons.” In light of the foregoing, certification of this appeal should be vacated as improvidently granted.
Even if this appeal satisfied the standards for certification, I nonetheless disagree with the majority on the substantive merits of this appeal and, thus, would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons Judge Reisner so ably *497 set forth. Reilly v. AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. Co. of N.J., 390 N.J.Super. 496 , 915 A.2d 1105 (App.Div.2007).
I therefore respectfully dissent.
For reversal—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, ALBIN, WALLACE, and HOENS—5.
For dismissal—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.