finding that a newspaper’s republieation of Governor’s report on organized crime was within the ambit of the privilege and not an abuse of that privilege
How later courts described this case
- finding that a newspaper’s republieation of Governor’s report on organized crime was within the ambit of the privilege and not an abuse of that privilege
- discussing fair report privilege and stating that it is not essential that official report be set forth verbatim by newspaper; rather "[a] summary of substantial accuracy is all that is required"
- accepting section 611, but stating that the privilege is lost upon a showing that the material was published solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed
- finding privilege is lost through “exaggerated additions, or embellishments”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I do not think the facts in this case merit the granting of plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the whole record, nor do the facts merit the majority’s determination that the privileged occasion was not abused. Such a determination must be so clear that but one conclusion can be drawn. The division of the court below demonstrates the absence of such a single conclusion; hence the determination whether the privileged occasion was abused should be left to the jury. See Restatement, Torts §619 (1938) ; Annotation, 26 A.L.R. 830 , 856 (1923). I would vacate the lower court’s entry of the judgment entered upon the whole record and would resubmit the question of whether the facts as developed at trial constituted an abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion, as well as the question of damages, to a jury.
I also must dissent if for no other reason than to disassociate myself from the majority’s concluding paragraph. This suit in no way involves “the freedom of the press.” The action here is not instituted to restrain the publishers from printing a story, but rather to enforce a long-acknowledged common-law right which grants money damages in civil suits to those whose reputations have been harmed by disparaging and defamatory statements. Nor do I see in this action anything that is involved with a determination that impinges upon any constitutional guarantee, and surely the majority’s observation that this action im *608 pinges upon the “public’s right to know” is most inaccurate. The so-called “public’s right to know” does not supply a license for slander or libel.