holding that where an attorney promptly notifies Disciplinary Counsel of the foreign discipline and No. 26-BG-0059 refrains from practicing law in the District during the period of suspension in the original jurisdiction, reciprocal discipline may run concurrent with the original discipline
How later courts described this case
- holding that where an attorney promptly notifies Disciplinary Counsel of the foreign discipline and No. 26-BG-0059 refrains from practicing law in the District during the period of suspension in the original jurisdiction, reciprocal discipline may run concurrent with the original discipline
- holding that where an attorney promptly notifies Disciplinary Counsel of the foreign discipline and refrains from practicing law in the District during the No. 26-BG-0060 period of suspension in the original jurisdiction, reciprocal discipline may run concurrent with the original discipline
- holding that where an attorney promptly notifies Disciplinary Counsel of the original discipline and refrains from practicing law in the District during the period of suspension in the original jurisdiction, reciprocal discipline shall run concurrent with the original discipline
- when an attorney promptly notifies Bar Counsel of disciplinary proceedings in another jurisdiction and voluntarily stops practicing in the District of Columbia during the period of suspension in the original jurisdiction, concurrent suspension will be the norm
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLY, Associate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all but Part IV of the majority opinion. As I read the record, there is no dispute that respondent did not practice law in the District of Columbia during the period of his suspension. To have done so, he says, citing Md.Ann.Code Art. 10, § 1 (1957) and 61 Op.Atty.Gen. 43 (1976), would have been a violation of the Maryland order. Bar counsel argues only that since respondent’s name remained on the active roll of our Bar during the suspension, he was “eligible for all privileges and subject to all liabilities attendant to that status,” and that a “voluntary withdrawal from practice cannot be equated with the imposition of professional discipline.” These arguments are unpersuasive. I see no reason to remand. It is appropriate under these circumstances to suspend respondent from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for a thirty-day period nunc pro tunc to run concurrently with his Maryland suspension. 1
. I note in passing that as a result of show cause orders, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland declined to impose additional discipline, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ordered a concurrent thirty-day suspension nunc pro tunc.