State v. Elders

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination of this cause substantially for the reasons persuasively explained by Judge Weeker in State v. Elders, 386 N.J.Super. 208 , 899 A.2d 1037 (App.Div.2006). I add only the following.

The majority takes issue with what it characterizes as the Appellate Division’s failure to “apply the correct standard of review for a suppression hearing.” Ante, 192 N.J. at 231, 927 A.2d at 1254 (2007). According to the majority, the panel engaged in “its own factfindings,” ante, at 238, 927 A.2d at 1258, “did not defer to the motion judge’s factfindings,” ante, at 242, 927 A.2d at *252 1261, and thus “improperly substituted its own factfindings for those of the motion judge[,]” ibid. In the end, the majority concludes that “[t]he Appellate Division in this case did not apply the deferential standard of review to the motion judge’s findings.” Ante, at 245, 927 A.2d at 1262. For the reasons that follow, I disagree.

Instead of parsing out the panel’s words on the subject, it is more instructive to read, as an integrated whole, how the panel viewed its task in this appeal:

When the outcome of a suppression hearing is dependent upon the judge’s findings of fact, including witness credibility, we defer to those findings as long as they are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 , 724 A.2d 234 (1999). Here, however, the outcome is based upon the judge’s application of the law to facts that are essentially undisputed. The most telling evidence at the hearing was the videotape of the highway incident, and the only witnesses at the hearing were the two troopers most closely involved in the incident. No material factual dispute or contradiction arose from that evidence, and no special deference to judicial factfinding is warranted. We are satisfied that the troopers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was evidence of crime in the vehicle they sought to search.

[ Elders, supra, 386 N.J.Super. at 228 , 899 A.2d 1037 .]

There is nothing in the Appellate Division’s decision that supports the conclusion that it willy-nilly jettisoned the motion judge’s factual findings in favor of its own. Indeed, the panel explains— and no one contests — that there were no material factual disputes here. Thus, all that remained was the application of law to those undisputed facts. And, in that context, we have repeatedly and uniformly held that “[a] trial court’s interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.” Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 , 658 A.2d 1230 (1995). See Raspa v. Office of the Sheriff, 191 N.J. 323, 334-35 , 924 A.2d 435 (2007) (same, quoting Manalapan Realty, supra); State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 209 , 919 A.2d 813 (2007) (“We therefore owe no deference to the interpretation of the trial court or the appellate panel, and apply instead a de novo standard of review” (citation omitted)); State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 , 859 A.2d 364 (2004) (same, quoting Manalapan Realty, supra); Pheasant Bridge Corp. v. Twp. of Warren, 169 N.J. 282, 293 , 777 *253 A.2d 334 (2001) (same, citing Manalapan Realty, supra); In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 , 693 A.2d 92 (1997) (“If, however, an appellate court is reviewing a trial court’s legal conclusions, the same level of deference is not required” (citing Manalapan Realty, supra)). Applying the law to the facts, the panel concluded, in respect of the actual search of the car, that “the troopers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that there was evidence of crime in the vehicle they sought to search.” Elders, supra, 386 N.J. Super, at 228, 899 A.2d 1037 . That is a conclusion of law derived from the application of law to a given set of facts. It is only that legal conclusion that is at odds with the motion judge’s legal conclusion; there is no substantive difference between factual findings relied on by the motion judge and those the panel referenced in support of its conclusion.

The Appellate Division did reject the motion judge’s factual findings in a limited respect: “whether [defendant Christopher] Leach’s apparent request for an attorney earlier in the confrontation was a sufficient basis for the judge to conclude that Leach’s subsequent consent was not voluntary.” Id. at 230 , 899 A.2d 1037 . The panel recited at length the factual findings made by the motion judge concerning that matter, and it “reeognize[d its] obligation to give deference to the [factual] findings of the Law Division judge, as long as those findings are based upon sufficient credible evidence in the record.” Id. at 231 , 899 A.2d 1037 (citing Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474 , 724 A.2d 234 ). The Appellate Division explained, however, that “the rationale for according the trial judge’s finding such deference is that those findings ‘are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.’ ” Id. at 232, 724 A.2d 234 (quoting State v. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 474 , 724 A2d 234 ).

The panel explained that, because “the observations upon which the motion judge explicitly made his findings and drew his conclusions came from the videotaped encounter, and [because] that videotape is equally available to us[,]” it readily was able to gauge *254 whether those findings were supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Ibid. It determined that they were not. As the Appellate Division noted, its “own observations [of the videotape] do not support the findings cited by the judge to conclude that Leach did not voluntarily consent to the search.” Ibid. The panel then listed five separate reasons for rejecting the motion judge’s findings in respect of Leach’s consent to the search of his car. Id. at 232-33, 724 A.2d 234 . Having given due deference to the motion judge, the Appellate Division nonetheless concluded that his findings were not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. It was for that reason — and not from the application of an incorrect standard of review — that the panel reversed the motion judge’s ruling.

Because the majority reverses the judgment of the Appellate Division based on its view that the panel applied an incorrect standard of review, because I disagree with that conclusion, and because I would affirm the panel’s legal conclusion that both the search and Leach’s consent to search were proper, I respectfully dissent.

For affirmance in part/reversal in part/remandment — Chief Justice ZAZZALI and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE and HOENS — 6.

For affirmance — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.