concluding that an instrument evidenced an intent to extinguish an easement when the instrument’s terms were inconsistent with the easement’s continued existence
How later courts described this case
- concluding that an instrument evidenced an intent to extinguish an easement when the instrument’s terms were inconsistent with the easement’s continued existence
- concluding that the common law rights of riparian property owners “are subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its public trust rights”
- discussing the rights of riparian property owners, subject to the public trust easement
- discussing the nature and scope of the riparian right to construct piers and wharf-out
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLIFFORD, Justice,
dissenting.
Because, in my view, the Superior Court correctly determined that AHI’s rights in the statutorily created easement were not extinguished by virtue of AHI’s lease with the Bureau of Public Lands, I respectfully dissent.
AHI’s property interest in the easement is separate and distinct from the leasehold interest. The fact that the lease covered the same property that was subject to the statutory easement does not extinguish the easement. “[A]n easement is not divested by the acts of the owner of the easement in seeking and obtaining permission or license from the owner of the servient estate to make the same use of the latter’s premises as could be made under the existing servitude.” 25 Am. Jur.2d Easements & Licenses § 109 (1966). An intent on the part of the owner to release an interest such as the statutory easement cannot lightly be inferred. Before such a release can operate to terminate such a property interest, the intent to do so must be clearly expressed. Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361, 366-67 , 84 A. 530 (1912).
The lease AHI signed with the Bureau concerns an area greater than that covered by the statutory easement and is for a longer period of time. The lease contains no language expressly releasing AHI’s interest in the statutory easement, nor does it contain any other provisions from which such a release may be inferred. Moreover, as noted by the trial court, there is language in the statute creating the lease that suggests a possibility of the simultaneous existence of both a lease and the statutory easement. 12 M.R.S.A. § 558-A(2)(A)(l)(e).
I would affirm the judgment of the Superi- or Court without modification.