finding appellant raised a substantial question by arguing the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to set forth adequate reasons to justify the disparity between his sentence and that of his co- defendant
How later courts described this case
- finding appellant raised a substantial question by arguing the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to set forth adequate reasons to justify the disparity between his sentence and that of his co- defendant
- Meyers raised a substantial question when arguing that, “the sentencing court abused its discretion by failing to set forth adequate reasons to justify the disparity between his sentence and that of his co-defendant.”
- “A sentencing court is not required to impose the same sentence on all participants in a crime.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CIRILLO, President Judge,
dissenting opinion:
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s decision to reach the merits of this appeal. Myers challenges discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed. Where a purely discretionary aspect of sentencing is being challenged, the appellant must include in his brief a “concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 9781(b). This statement must show that there exists a “substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under [the Sentencing Code].” Id.; Pa. R.A.P. 2119(f); see also Commonwealth v. Tuladzeicki, 513 Pa. 508 , 522 A.2d 17 (1987).
I disagree with the majority decision in Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511 , 533 A.2d 134 (1987) (en banc), which held that an appellant’s failure to comply with Pa. R.A.P. 2119(f) and Tuladziecki, if not objected to by the appellee, is a waivable procedural violation. Compliance with the rule is necessary in order to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. The Krum majority, in my opinion, has misinterpreted Tuladziecki. See Krum, 367 Pa.Super. at 520 , 533 A.2d at 139 (Brosky, J., dissenting); see also Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 366 Pa.Super. 328 , 531 A.2d 441 (1987) (en banc) (Cirillo, P.J., concurring). In failing to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, Myers has failed to properly invoke this court’s jurisdiction. The proper course, *333 under the supreme court’s ruling in Tuladziecki, is to quash this appeal.