explaining that evidence of prior criminal acts that the defendant makes relevant to prove the crimes with which he is charged is admissible; however, “such evidence must be accompanied by a cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for which that evidence has been admitted”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that evidence of prior criminal acts that the defendant makes relevant to prove the crimes with which he is charged is admissible; however, “such evidence must be accompanied by a cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for which that evidence has been admitted”
- stating special circumstance exists to admit evidence of defendant’s pri- or violent acts, where defendant made statement about prior acts to threaten and intimidate another, and force or threat of force is element of crime for which defendant is being prosecuted
- holding that "such evidence must be accompanied by a cautionary instruction which fully and carefully explains to the jury the limited purpose for which that evidence has been admitted"
- concluding that the trial court’s giving of a detailed cautionary instruction was sufficient to overcome prejudicial effect of the introduction of prior bad acts evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*207 NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that appellee’s statements relating to a prior criminal act were properly admitted under the facts of this case. I take issue with the suggestion that this ruling is a novel one and that we are here creating a new exception.
The purpose for excluding evidence of prior unrelated crimes is first that it is irrelevant and second that the effect of such testimony creates an unfair prejudice against the defendant in the minds of the jury. Where, as here, it is unquestionably relevant to a disputed element of the crime charged its admissibility cannot be questioned. The evidence is not being offered to show a predisposition to commit a criminal act on the part of the accused, but rather to describe the threat employed to overcome the will of the victim. Nor is it being offered to establish that appellee had in fact committed a prior criminal act. The recognition of a “verbal act” is not new to our law, nor is its admissibility questionable where its relevancy is clear.
ZAPPALA, J., joins in this concurring opinion.