holding that because defendant “lacks standing to raise either a constitutional challenge or a statutory challenge to the legality” of co-defendant’s statement, he was not entitled to instruction regarding voluntariness of statement
How later courts described this case
- holding that because defendant “lacks standing to raise either a constitutional challenge or a statutory challenge to the legality” of co-defendant’s statement, he was not entitled to instruction regarding voluntariness of statement
- recognizing that the government's “failure to preserve potentially useful evidence” does not violate due process unless the defendant shows that the loss of the evidence resulted from “bad faith on the part of the police.”
- stating that a “conviction should be reversed for unobjected-to jury charge error only if it resulted in ‘egregious harm’” and “[h]arm is egregious if it deprives the appellant of a ‘fair and impartial trial’”
- holding, in context of challenge to admission of another person’s confession, that if defendant lacks standing to raise constitutional challenge, he is not entitled to article 38.23 instruction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MEYERS, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
In Appellant’s sixth point of error, he argues that the trial court erred in failing to empanel a separate jury to determine whether he is mentally retarded. I agree that when the issue of mental retardation is raised, a separate jury should consider whether the defendant is mentally retarded prior to the beginning of a capital murder trial. 1 A jury who has already decided that a defendant is guilty of capital murder, and that he is a future danger and has no mitigating factors in his favor may not be in the best position to make the determination of whether the defendant is mentally retarded. Because the special issues in a capital murder trial are so intertwined, hearing the evidence related to the special issues may result in undue influence on the jury when considering the defendant’s claim of mental retardation. Thus, the jury’s answers to the special issues may prejudice them against the defendant for the purpose of a mental retardation determination. Alternatively, it is also possible that the defendant’s presentation of evidence related to a mental retardation claim could adversely affect the jury’s decision on the mitigation issue. I feel that the determination of whether a defendant is mentally retarded should be conducted in a manner similar to a hearing regarding competency to stand trial.
However, in the case before us, I do not disagree with the conclusion that the defendant is not mentally retarded and I do not dispute the jury findings on the special issues. Due to the facts of this specific case, I agree that there was no need for a separate jury to consider the mental retardation issue. Therefore, I concur in point of error six and otherwise join the opinion of the majority.
. This should only be done when the defendant has made a prima facie showing that he is mentally retarded.